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1FINDING A CEILING IN A CIRCULAR ROOM: LOCKE V. DAVEY, FEDERALISM, 
AND RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 
 
Jesse R. Merriam*
The text of the U.S. Constitution clearly distinguishes religion from non-religion 
by providing that while Congress may pass laws concerning many subjects and 
prohibiting many things, Congress may not make laws respecting the establishment of 
religion or prohibiting religious exercise.1 As the distinctiveness of religion is clear from 
the text, the Court has had no problem settling that religion, as a subject matter, and 
religious believers, as a class of persons, are constitutionally distinct.2 Though not 
explicated in the text, it is equally clear, and equally settled, that the Religion Clauses tug 
the government in opposite directions.  Noting this tension, the Court has tread the line 
between the Clauses carefully, holding that if the government opposes the establishment 
of religion too vigorously it will burden religious exercise,3 and if the government seeks 
to accommodate religious exercise too liberally it will establish religion.4 However, 
while these propositions—that religion is distinct and that there is tension between the 
Clauses—are clear and settled, the Court has struggled mightily to reconcile them.  That 
is, the Court has not been able to answer the following question: How differently may the 
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1 The text of the Religion Clauses provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 For example, the Court has held that because religion is constitutionally distinct from non-religion, the 
Constitution requires the government to exempt people from laws that substantially burden their religious 
beliefs; but the Constitution does not require the government to exempt people from laws that substantially 
burden their secular conscientious beliefs.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (“Thus, 
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary 
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated 
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was 
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the 
Religion Clauses.”).  
3 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 228 (1978).  
4 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).   
2government treat religion from non-religion under one Clause without violating the 
other?    
In the government funding context, this bears on the question of whether states 
may exclude religious organizations from generally available funding programs.  This is 
a question of both practical and normative significance.   Practically, the question is quite 
significant to many states considering K-12 voucher programs.  If the answer to this 
question is that the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to include religious 
organizations in funding programs, then states must include religious schools in their 
voucher programs.  Consequently, tax dollars that have been reserved for secular schools 
will soon end up going to religious schools.  Although government funding of religious 
education might be desirable for some,5 it is troubling for many American taxpayers.6
Significantly, because government funding of religious education is troubling for many 
taxpayers, a constitutional rule requiring states to treat religious schools like secular 
schools might discourage many states from experimenting with voucher programs.  That 
such a rule might discourage states from creating voucher programs is worrisome—not 
only because voucher programs might be a good idea, but also because many low-income 
communities might need this sort of educational experimentation.7 Alternatively, if the 
answer to this question is that in pursuing the goals of the Establishment Clause the 
government may exclude religious organizations from funding programs, then many 
 
5 See, e.g., The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Schools, at 
http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/topic/7.html (“The Becket Fund believes that government may not 
specially exclude schools or students from government funding, or any other government benefit, simply 
because they are religious.”) 
6 See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Vouchers/Religious School Funding, at 
http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issues_vouchers (“Americans must be free to contribute 
only to the religious groups of their choosing. Voucher programs violate this principle by forcing all 
taxpayers to underwrite religious education.”)  
7 See Black Alliance for Educational Options, Tax-Supported Scholarships (Vouchers), at 
http://www.baeo.org/programs?program_id=5&program_category_secondary_page_id=20.  
3deserving and benevolent organizations might be discriminated against under the guise of 
the U.S. Constitution.  That their Constitution sanctions this discrimination would 
surprise, and even worse, upset, many Americans.   
Normatively, the question is quite significant to constitutional lawyers and 
scholars.  If the answer to this question is that the Free Exercise Clause requires the 
government to include religious organizations in funding programs, then James 
Madison’s argument about the taxpayer’s conscience8 will be eradicated from First 
Amendment law, and thus, a foundational work on church-state relations will no longer 
apply to constitutional adjudication.  Additionally, if the government must include 
religious organizations in their funding programs, the discretion that states have in 
developing their own church-state partnerships will be limited.  This limitation on state 
discretion is an important addition to church-state law because many believe that the 
Religion Clauses were originally intended and understood to grant states control over 
how they partner with religious organizations.9 However, if the answer to this question is 
that the government may exclude religious organizations from generally available 
funding programs, there is a risk that the primary criterion of church-state 
jurisprudence—neutrality towards religion—will be lost.  
This Article attempts to answer the question of how differently the government 
may treat religion from non-religion under one Clause without violating the other.  My 
 
8 In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, James Madison argued that 
government funding of religion violates the taxpayer’s conscience.  The Remonstrance can be found in 8 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973).  The Remonstrance also can 
be found in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rutledge, J. 
dissenting). 
9 See STEVEN SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-54 (Oxford University Press 1995); and EDWARD S. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF 
POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 106 (Michie Co., 1951) (declaring that "the principal importance of the 
[First] Amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective jurisdictions of State and 
nation regarding religion . . .  .").   
4answer is inspired and informed by the Court’s 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey.10 In 
Davey, the Court addressed a claim by a student, Joshua Davey, that the State of 
Washington unconstitutionally excluded him from the Washington State Promise 
Scholarship.—a college scholarship awarded only to those students who satisfied certain 
academic,11 financial,12 geographic, 13 and religious14 requirements.  Joshua Davey 
satisfied the first three conditions, but because he declared a double major in Business 
Administration and Pastoral Ministries at a religious college, Davey failed to satisfy the 
fourth condition prohibiting the use of the Promise Scholarship for the study of religion 
from a devotional perspective.. After Washington denied him the scholarship, Davey 
claimed that Washington violated three provisions of the U.S. Constitution15 by denying 
Davey the scholarship based on his decision to major in Pastoral Ministries at a religious 
college. The Court rejected Davey’s claim, holding that at least in certain contexts the 
government may exclude an individual from a funding program on the basis of religion. 
 
10 540 US 712 (2004).  
11 Washington provided scholarships only to students who ranked in the top 15% of the graduating class, or 
who had performed a 1200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I, or a score of 27 or better on the 
American College Test. Id. at 716.  
12 Washington provided scholarships only to students with a family income below 135% of the state 
median. Id.
13 Washington provided scholarships only to students who “enroll at ‘least half time in an eligible 
postsecondary institution in the state of Washington.’” Id.
14 Washington provided scholarships only to students who did not pursue a degree in theology at the 
institution while receiving the scholarship. Id. It should be noted this is a statutory requirement that 
“simply codifies the State’s constitutional prohibition” on public funding of religious education. Id. It also 
should be noted that this fourth requirement permits applicants to major in theology from an academic 
perspective but does not permit applicants to major in theology from a perspective that is "devotional in 
nature or designed to induce religious faith.” Id. 
15 One, Davey claimed that Washington violated the Free Speech Clause by discriminating on the basis of 
viewpoint—that is, Washington refused to fund Davey’s studies because Davey decided to study religion 
from a devotional perspective.  Two, Davey claimed that Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause by 
burdening his religious exercise with a religiously discriminatory law.  And three, Davey argued that 
Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the basis of religion.  It should be 
noted that the merits of Davey’s free speech and equal protection claims will not be addressed in this 
Article.   
5Much that has been written about Davey has been negative.  Immediately after the 
Court issued the decision, the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities expressed its 
disappointment with the ruling.16 Several conservative publications featured articles 
criticizing the decision.17 And several legal scholars sharply derided the Davey Court’s 
reasoning.18 Perhaps the most incisive academic criticism has come from Professor 
Laycock, who warned in his Harvard Law Review article that the decision’s 
maximization of “government discretion and judicial deference . . . threatens religious 
liberty.”19 
In this Article, I take on these critiques of Davey. In so doing, I hope to 
accomplish three goals: (1) to defend the holding and reasoning in Davey; (2) to assuage 
the concerns of Davey’s critics; and (3) to develop a paradigm that grants states discretion 
over how they partner with religious organization but still limits states in a way that is 
consistent with the guarantees in the Religion Clauses.  These goals are addressed in 
three Parts.  
 
16 Council for Christian Colleges & Universities, Statement on Locke v. Davey, at 
http://www.cccu.org/news/newsID.260,parentNav.Archives/news_past_detail.asp (“On behalf of its 129 
U.S. members and affiliates, the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities expresses its disappointment 
with today's ruling in Locke v. Davey . . . .”).  
17 See, e.g., National Review Online, Open Door to Religious Discrimination, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/dokupil200402270920.asp (claiming that the Promise 
Scholarship “wrongfully discriminates against religion” and accusing the Davey decision of “erod[ing] the 
principle of neutrality toward religion”).   
18 Professor Eugene Volokh has criticized the opinion in his blog.  See The Volokh Conspiracy, 
Discrimination Against Religion, at http://volokh.com/2004_02_22_volokh_archive.html (“I think Justice 
Scalia's dissent is far more persuasive than the Chief Justice's majority opinion. The one good thing I can 
say about the case is that the opinions are short enough that they'll be less trouble than usual to excerpt in 
my 2004 casebook supplement.”).  Also, Professor Stephen Bainbridge harshly criticized the opinion in his 
blog, approvingly citing Professor Volokh’s criticism and suggesting that the opinion upheld anti-Catholic 
bigotry.  See Professor Bainbridge, Eugene Volokh on Locke v. Davey, at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/12/eugene_volokh_o.html.  For a longer and more detailed 
critique of the opinion, see Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Davey's Mistakes and the Future of State 
Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L.J. 2 (2005). 
19 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the 
Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004). 
6Part I defends Davey. This defense begins by establishing the proposition that 
Davey is a case about both Religion Clauses.  After Part I.A demonstrates that Davey is 
about both Religion Clauses, Part I.B branches into an analysis of Davey’s claim under 
each Clause.  Part I.B.1 analyzes the claim under the Free Exercise Clause.  This Subpart 
concludes that Washington’s decision not to fund religious instruction is not a clear 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause; this conclusion rests on the distinction between 
Davey and three categories of free exercise violations.  Part I.B.2 analyzes Washington’s 
interest in excluding Davey under the Establishment Clause.  This Subpart concludes that 
states have a substantial interest in developing policies on church-state relations that both 
prevent taxpayers from experiencing a conscientious burdening and that encourage 
harmony among different religious groups.  
Part II claims that Davey’s grant of discretion to states in developing church-state 
partnerships might have many salutary effects.  Considering the intent of the Framers, 
empirical data, and recent legal scholarship, this Part contends that discretion can lead to 
greater religious liberty and political accountability in the states.  
Part III develops a paradigm that circumscribes state discretion—a paradigm in 
which the states have discretion to experiment with different levels of both the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, but also a paradigm in which both 
religious disestablishment and liberty are guaranteed.  
I.  DEFENDING DAVEY 
A. Why Davey Is a Case about Both Religion Clauses 
Whether framed as a critique or a defense of Davey, every significant piece of 
scholarship on Davey has analyzed the merits of Davey’s claim exclusively in terms of 
7the Free Exercise Clause.20 That many have limited their discussions of Davey to the 
Free Exercise Clause should not come as a surprise.  After all, limiting a discussion of 
Davey to the Free Exercise Clause makes quite a bit of sense if one thinks about the case 
linearly.  The linear equation is as follows:   
Davey claimed that Washington violated his right to exercise his religious beliefs, 
a right incorporated to Washington through the 14th Amendment.  Washington defended 
its exclusion of Davey by denying that the exclusion violated Davey’s right to exercise 
his religious beliefs, and by arguing that Washington was required by the 
disestablishment mandate in its state constitution to exclude Davey from the program.  
Since the Supremacy Clause means that Washington’s obligations under the U.S. 
Constitution trump any obligations Washington has under its state constitution,21 it 
follows that the dispute between Davey and Washington came down to the Free Exercise 
Clause.   
Although categorizing Davey as a straightforward free exercise case certainly 
seems right under this linear equation, such a categorization is wrong because it ignores 
the substantial role that the Establishment Clause played in the case.  Following is a 
discussion of three ways in which the Establishment Clause was involved.  
1. The Establishment Clause provides the background for Washington’s 
interest in excluding Davey.   
 
Washington claimed that it excluded Davey in order to protect taxpayers from the 
burden of conscience that results when the government uses tax dollars to fund religion.  
 
20 This is not to say that commentators have not discussed the background issue of what the government 
may not fund under the Establishment Clause.  Instead, this is to say that in analyzing whether or not 
Davey’s claim should have prevailed, commentators have focused on the fact that “Davey's claim appeared 
to be a slam dunk under Lukumi.” Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and 
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 173 (2004). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. VI.  
8Significantly, Washington’s interest in protecting its taxpayers is the same interest that 
James Madison had in mind in his Remonstrance.  The relationship between 
Washington’s exclusion of Davey and Madison’s Remonstrance is significant because the 
Remonstrance is enmeshed in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  For 
example, in Everson v. Board of Education,22 the landmark case incorporating the 
Establishment Clause, the Court cited the Remonstrance as a basis for finding that a 
primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect citizens from this conscientious 
burden—this, in both the majority23 and dissenting24 opinions.  Thus, Washington’s 
interest in excluding Davey is part of a long tradition of protecting citizens from religious 
establishment—a tradition, moreover, that underlies the Court’s understanding of the 
Establishment Clause, and a tradition, perhaps, that inspired the adoption of the Clause.25 
Because Washington’s exclusion of Davey is part of this tradition, Washington’s 
exclusion is understood best by discussing the tradition.  Therefore, many of the concerns 
that underlie the Establishment Clause—specifically, the problems that arise when the 
government directly or indirectly funds religious instruction—are relevant to a discussion 
of Davey.
2. Washington’s justification for excluding Davey under its state 
constitution is directly related to the Rehnquist Court’s narrow 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  
 
22 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).  
23 See id. at 13 (noting that “[t]his Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First 
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had 
the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on 
religious liberty as the Virginia statute”).   
24 See id. at 37 (Rutledge, J. dissenting) (finding that “the Remonstrance is at once the most concise and the 
most accurate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what is 'an establishment 
of religion.'”).  
25 LEONARD W. LEVY, “THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT,” in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 44 (Baylor University 
Press, 1984) (noting that there is a broad and a narrow interpretation of the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, and that “[t]he heart of this broad interpretation is that the First Amendment 
prohibits even government aid impartially and equitably administered to all religious groups.”).   
9The relationship between Washington’s citation of its state constitution and the 
Rehnquist Court’s narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause is evident by 
imagining that the dispute between Davey and Washington arose before Zelman.
Before the Court decided Zelman in 2002 it was unclear whether the 
Establishment Clause permitted states to provide substantial funding for religious 
instruction.26 Thus, if Davey arose before Zelman, a critical constitutional question 
would have been whether Washington could include Davey in the program under the 
Establishment Clause.  Accordingly, if Davey arose before Zelman, Washington surely 
would have cited the Establishment Clause in order to justify its exclusion of Davey.  
However, because Davey arose after Zelman, it was clear that the Establishment 
Clause permitted Washington to include Davey in the program.  As this was clear, 
Washington could not turn to the U.S. Constitution as a justification for excluding Davey.  
Instead, Washington had to turn to its own constitution.  Thus, Washington’s reliance on 
its own constitution instead of the U.S. Constitution can be understood as an incident of 
the views that the five Justices in the Zelman majority, two of whom are no longer on the 
bench,27 held on the Establishment Clause.   
This is significant because the Zelman majority expressed a view on the 
Establishment Clause that sharply diverges from the views held by the four Justices 
 
26 Some might point to Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) for the 
proposition that the government may indirectly provide substantial funding to religious organizations.  But 
Witters does not support this proposition because that case came down to the fact that under the program 
“only a small handful [of the recipients] are sectarian” and “nothing in the record indicate[d] that . . . any 
significant portion of the aid expended . . . will end up flowing to religious education.” Id. at 488.   Davey 
is much more like Zelman than Witters, because if Davey prevailed, Washington probably would have to 
fund more than a handful of sectarian schools, and, moreover, a significant portion of the aid would go to 
purely sectarian education.  That the government may provide substantial funding to education of a purely 
sectarian nature through a generally available funding program was not established in Witters but rather in 
Zelman.
27Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were in the Zelman majority.   
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dissenting in Zelman. All of these Justices are still on the bench, and considering the 
vigorous dissents incited in Zelman,28 there is reason to believe that these four Justices 
still believe that states violate the Establishment Clause when they provide substantial 
funding to religious instruction.   
Furthermore, the Zelman majority expressed a view on the Establishment Clause 
that diverges from the historical foundation of the Establishment Clause29 and the Court’s 
core Establishment Clause precedent.30 Thus, the difference between Washington’s 
exclusion of Davey being a state constitutional issue and an Establishment Clause issue 
comes down to an interpretation of the Establishment Clause (that might be held by only 
three sitting Justices) that is neither compelled by precedent nor close to how four sitting 
Supreme Court Justices interpret the Establishment Clause.    
This, of course, is not to say that the Zelman majority’s interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause should not be binding law.  As our system currently operates, a 
majority vote on a given issue is enough to create binding law.  This is true even if the 
majority is a slim one, and even if the majority’s holding varies from precedent.  Zelman 
is therefore the law of the land despite the fact that the majority opinion differs sharply 
from both the Court’s precedent and mainstream interpretations of the Establishment 
Clause.  
But accepting that Zelman is good law does not mean that the majority in Zelman 
should have the power to demote what was recently a federal constitutional issue to a 
 
28 See the dissenting opinions in Zelman. Id. at 684-729. 
29 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (“This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First 
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had 
the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on 
religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”); 
30 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
11
mere state constitutional interest.  Since Washington’s reason for excluding Davey is 
very much in line with the Court’s Establishment Clause precedent and mainstream 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause, Washington’s exclusion of Davey should be 
understood in light of that precedent and in light of those mainstream interpretations.   
3. The strength of the Establishment Clause could have been affected by 
the Davey decision.  
 
The Establishment Clause must be considered when a decision interpreting the 
Free Exercise Clause to mean X could prevent the Court from interpreting the 
Establishment Clause to mean Y.  In Davey, this was the case, since had the Court held 
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from excluding religious 
organizations from general funding programs, the Court then would not be able to hold 
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from indirectly funding religious 
organizations.  This relationship between the Clauses is evident by imagining what would 
happen if, after deciding Davey, the Court were to decide that Zelman was the incorrect 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.   
Returning to the law as it was before Zelman would be simple if the Court ruled in 
Davey, as it did, that the Free Exercise Clause permits the government to discriminate on 
the basis of religion in order to exclude religious organizations from funding programs.  
In this case, the Court would simply have to overrule Zelman in order to return to the law 
as it was before Zelman.
However, had the Court ruled in Davey that the Free Exercise Clause always 
prohibits the government from discriminating on the basis of religion, as Jay Sekulow,31 
31 Jay Sekulow is the American Center for Law Justice Chief Counsel; he argued before the Supreme Court 
on behalf of Joshua Davey.  
12
urged in oral argument,32 the Court would have locked itself into a post-Zelman 
Establishment Clause.  
In demonstrating how an alternative ruling in Davey would have locked the Court 
into a post-Zelman Establishment Clause, first it should be noted that in the funding 
context the post- Employment Division v. Smith33 Free Exercise Clause and the pre-
Zelman Establishment Clause are contradictory.  Since Smith prohibits the government 
from formally discriminating against religious organizations,34 this free exercise 
formulation applied to government funding means that the government may not deny an 
organization generally available funding on the basis of the organization’s religious 
affiliation.  But, because the Burger Court held in Lemon v. Kurtzman35 that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from passing a law that could have the 
effect of establishing religion,36 this formulation means that in many situations the 
government must exclude religious organizations from generally available funding 
schemes.37 Accordingly, the pre-Zelman Establishment Clause and the post-Smith Free 
Exercise Clause mean that when the government makes funding available to the public, 
the government may neither include religious organizations in the program, nor exclude 
religious organizations from the program—that is, they stand for contradictory 
propositions.    
 
32 The oral argument can be found at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/1631/audioresources.  
33 494 U.S. 872.  
34 Id. at 886 n.3 (“Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on 
race . . .  so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”) (emphasis added). 
35 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
36 See id. at 612 (holding that there are three conditions that a law must satisfy in order to be valid under the 
Establishment Clause, and one of these conditions is that the “primary effect [of the law] must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion”).  
37 See, e.g., Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (holding 
that a statute providing benefits to all private schools, including religious schools, violated the 
Establishment Clause because the “inevitable effect [of including religious schools in the program is] to aid 
and advance those religious institutions”).  
13
Until recently, it appeared that this irreconcilable tension between the pre-Zelman 
Establishment Clause and the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause meant that the Court could 
not apply a post-Smith Free Exercise Clause to government funding cases.  However, 
over the past five years the Rehnquist Court radically modified the Burger Court’s 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by holding in Mitchell v. Helms38 that the 
government may directly fund the secular activities of religious organizations39 and in 
Zelman that the government may indirectly fund the religious activities of religious 
organizations.  Thus, under the Rehnquist Court’s modified Establishment Clause, the 
government often may include religious organizations in funding programs.  By 
interpreting the Establishment Clause to mean that the government may include religious 
organizations in funding programs, the Rehnquist Court reduced the tension between the 
Religion Clauses.  Now that the Establishment Clause question of whether the 
government may include religious organizations in funding programs is in the 
background, the new question has emerged of whether the post-Smith Free Exercise 
Clause applies to funding.40 
38 530 U.S. 793.  
39 It should be noted that the status of this proposition is still unclear, as Mitchell was a plurality opinion.  
40 A helpful, and interesting, way to visualize this relationship between the Religion Clauses is to consider 
the artist M.C. Escher’s use of interlocking images.  By interlocking images, Escher blurred the distinction 
between foreground and background.  A famous example of this is Escher’s Day and Night. For an image 
of the lithograph, go to: http://www.fantasyarts.net/Sci_fi/day_and_night_escher.jpg.  In that lithograph, 
the white geese are visible in the foreground only if one sees the black geese as part of the background, and 
the black geese are visible in the foreground only if one sees the white geese as part of the background.  
This relationship between the black and white geese in Escher’s Day and Night is analogous to the 
relationship between the Burger Court’s post-Lemon Establishment Clause and the Rehnquist Court’s post-
Smith Free Exercise Clause.  When the Burger Court’s Establishment Clause was in the foreground, the 
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause could not be fully seen in government funding cases.  However, as the 
Rehnquist Court modified the Establishment Clause, the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause has been brought 
into focus, much the way that Escher’s black birds are fully visible only after the white birds form the 
background.   Now that the Establishment Clause question of whether the government may include 
religious organizations in funding programs is in the background, the new question has emerged in the 
foreground: Does the Free Exercise Clause require the government to include religious organizations in 
generally available funding programs? 
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That brings us back to Davey. If the Court had ruled in Davey that the Free 
Exercise Clause always prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, even in funding 
programs, such a ruling on the Free Clause would lock the Court into a post-Zelman 
Establishment Clause, since the pre-Zelman Establishment Clause often permitted, and 
indeed required, the government to discriminate on the basis of religion.41 In other 
words, an alternative interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Davey would have 
locked the Court into a post-Zelman Establishment Clause.    
This is problematic as a matter of judicial integrity.  If the Court is committed to a 
post-Zelman Establishment Clause, the Court should make this commitment after being 
briefed on and considering the merits of Zelman under the Establishment Clause—not 
covertly through the backdoor of the Free Exercise Clause.42 
This is troubling enough when the decision on the Free Exercise Clause commits 
the Court to a relatively clear area of law under the Establishment Clause—the 
constitutionality of the indirect funding of religious organizations.  But this is particularly 
troubling when a ruling on the free exercise question could clarify an unclear area of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence—the constitutionality of the direct funding 
of religious organizations.   
Even after Mitchell v. Helms,43 there is still some doubt as to whether the 
government may fund the secular activities of religious organizations directly, and there 
is great doubt as to whether the government may fund the religious activities of religious 
 
41 See, e.g., Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).  
42 This relationship is again illustrated nicely by M.C. Escher’s Day and Night.  Since we cannot see the 
black geese until the white geese merge into the background, this means that if we are committed to seeing 
the black geese then we are also committed to not seeing the white geese.  Likewise, if the Court is 
committed to reading the Free Exercise Clause to mean that the government may not discriminate on the 
basis of religion, this means that the Court is thereby committed to a post-Zelman Establishment Clause. 
43 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
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organizations directly.  However, if the Court had ruled in Davey that the Free Exercise 
Clause prohibits the government from discriminating on the basis of religion in funding 
programs, there would be no difference under the Free Exercise Clause between the 
government excluding religious organizations from a funding program involving secular 
activities and the government excluding religious organizations from a funding program 
involving religious activities—both exclusions would be unconstitutional.  Thus, if the 
Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean that the government may never 
discriminate on the basis of religion, then the Court would have to rule that not only may 
the government directly fund the secular activities of religious organizations, but also that 
the government may fund the religious activities of religious organizations directly.   
Of course, such a rule would have great significance for the Faith-Based 
Initiative.  No longer would there be a question of whether faith-based organizations may 
compete with secular organizations for state funding.  Instead, every state would be 
required to permit faith-based organization compete for funding.  Moreover, because the 
government would be prohibited from ever discriminating against a religious 
organization, the permissibility of directly funding religious organizations might become 
a mandate when directly funding religious organizations would best achieve the 
government’s purpose in providing the funding.  Thus, in situations where a religious 
organization was clearly better at providing a given service, the government would be 
compelled by the U.S. Constitution to select the religious organization to provide the 
service, even if doing so required the government to fund religious activities.    
These possibilities of church-state partnerships are certainly a long way from any 
interpretation that the Court has given to the Establishment Clause.  But such partnerships 
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between government and religion are a logical outgrowth of an alternative ruling in 
Davey under the Free Exercise Clause.  In Davey, the Court could have radically 
transformed the relationship between government and religion under the Establishment 
Clause with an expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause.  If both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are to have equal value under the U.S. Constitution, 
both Clauses must be considered in decisions in which the interpretation of one Clause 
effectively will limit the range of interpretations that may be given to the other Clause.   
Thus, both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must be considered in 
a discussion of Davey.
B. Analyzing Davey Under Both Religion Clauses 
1. The Free Exercise Clause 
 
In searching the Court’s precedent for what constitutes a free exercise violation, 
the Davey Court found three categories of free exercise violations.  One category of free 
exercise violation arises when the government regulates religious exercise either through 
a civil or criminal penalty.44 A second category of violation occurs when the government 
denies a person the right to participate in the political affairs of a community on the basis 
of religion.45 And a third category of violation arises when the government forces a 
citizen “to choose between her religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”46 
In Davey, the Court upheld Washington’s exclusion of Davey by distinguishing 
Washington’s exclusion from these three categories of cases.  As the Court succinctly put 
it, Davey falls outside of these categories because Davey is a case where“[t]he State has 
 
44 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 720-21. 
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merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”47 Part I.B.1.a-c explains 
why Washington’s exclusion does not fall into any of these three categories of free 
exercise violations.  
a. Category One  
 
The first category of free exercise violation arises when the government regulates 
religious belief or conduct48 either through a civil or criminal penalty.  This category is 
the heart of the Free Exercise Clause.  While there has been some dispute as to whether 
this category includes situations where the government inadvertently regulates a religious 
exercise,49 or whether this category is limited to situations where the government either 
purposely or formally discriminates against a particular religious practice,50 there is 
widespread agreement that the Free Exercise Clause applies when the government 
regulates religious exercise.   
However, there is not widespread agreement as to whether this category includes 
situations where the government excludes an individual from a funding scheme on the 
basis of religion.  There is good reason to believe that, for Free Exercise Clause purposes, 
government regulation of conduct is different from government exclusion from funding.   
This distinction is found in the Court’s interpretation of the text of the Free Exercise 
Clause.   
 
47 Id. at 721. 
48 The Court used to distinguish between government regulation of religious conduct and government 
regulation of religious belief, holding that while the government may never interfere with religious 
opinions, the government may interfere with religious conduct.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878). The Court has abandoned this distinction—now religious conduct is protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause.      
49 This was the prevailing view before Smith. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).   
50 The view expressed in the Smith majority was that this category is limited to situations where the 
government formally discriminates against a particular religious practice.   In Lukumi, the Court extended 
this view to include situations where the government purposely discriminates against a particular religious 
practice. 
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The Court has interpreted this text to mean not only that the government may not 
prohibit individuals from participating in a religious exercise, but also that the 
government may not coerce individuals into participating or not participating in a 
religious exercise.51 With prohibition and coercion as the free exercise criteria, the 
distinction between government regulation and exclusion is obvious.  When the 
government regulates a religious practice, it will often prohibit or coerce a religious 
exercise.   However, when the government excludes an individual from public funding, 
the government will rarely prohibit or coerce a religious exercise.   This is elaborated 
below.    
 i. Prohibition of religious exercise 
In Lyng, the Court interpreted what it means to prohibit religious exercise under 
the Free Exercise Clause.  In that case, Native Americans in Northern California sought 
to enjoin the United States Forest Service from building a road on a piece of publicly 
owned land that Native Americans used for religious ceremonies.52 Turning to the facts, 
the Court found that building the road would not prevent the Native Americans from 
following their religious beliefs.53 While the government’s decision to build the road 
might prevent the Native Americans from conducting ceremonies on that land, the Native 
Americans could still conduct their ceremonies somewhere else.  Indeed, the Court found 
that “it seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it 
 
51 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  In 
determining whether the Free Exercise Clause protected the plaintiffs, the Court turned to the text.  Id. at 
443. In the text, the majority found that “the crucial word is ‘prohibit.’” Id. at 451. The Court then read 
prohibition to include more than outright prohibitions, but coercion as well. Id. at 450.  
52 Id. at 443. 
53 Id. at 451. 
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will doom their religion.”54 Accordingly, the Court held that the government did not 
prohibit a religious exercise and, therefore, the government could build the road.55 
Under the reasoning in Lyng, whether or not there is prohibition of a religious 
exercise comes down to the relationship between a citizen’s desire to exercise a religious 
practice and the citizen’s ability to participate in that practice.  When the government’s 
action is the essential link between the citizen’s desire and ability, the government may 
not act in a way that could prevent the citizen from following her religious beliefs.   
There was no essential link in Lyng because the government’s decision of whether or not 
to build the road did not stand in between the Native Americans’ desire to practice their 
religious beliefs and their ability to do so.    
While the government’s use of its own property rarely is the essential link 
between an individual’s desire and ability to participate in a religious exercise, there are 
many situations where government regulation is the essential link.  In Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,56 for example, the city of Hialeah prohibited the ritual 
sacrifice of animals, which is required by the Santerian religion.57 Because of the 
Hialeah statute, Santerians could not follow their religion.58 Thus, Hialeah’s ordinance 
was the essential link between the desire of Santerians to follow their religion, and the 
ability of Santerians to do so.  Accordingly, the Court ruled that the statute violated the 
Free Exercise Clause.  
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 458. 
56 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
57 Id. at 526. 
58 Of course, for a short period of time Santerians could follow their religion under the Hialeah ordinance 
by paying the fine or going to jail.  But repeatedly doing so is not practicable.  Paying a fine repeatedly 
would put many Santerians in a position where they could no longer pay the fine, and therefore could no 
longer practice their religion.  And going to jail would put Santerians away from the animals necessary to 
perform the rituals, thereby preventing them from practicing their religion.   Thus, the regulation ultimately 
was the essential link between their desire to practice Santerianism and their ability to do so.  
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When compared to the government’s use of its property and the government’s 
regulation of a religious exercise, it is clear that the government’s exclusion of an 
individual from a funding scheme is much more similar to the government’s use of its 
property.  Government funding is like government property—in both situations, the 
government establishes how and when a given item will be used.  Because people often 
have a means of practicing their religions outside the premises of the government 
property, as the Native Americans in Lyng did, the government rarely prohibits religious 
exercise by deciding how to use its property, as the Court held in Lyng. Likewise, 
because people often have a means of practicing their religions without using government 
funding, the government rarely, if ever, prohibits religious exercise by excluding a person 
from a funding program.   
This is clear in Davey. Based on the facts, it appears that despite Washington’s 
exclusion of Davey from the Promise Scholarship, Davey still was able to study theology 
from a devotional perspective at a religious college.59 Of course, without the Promise 
Scholarship Davey might have had to pay for his studies.  But Davey had that choice.  
Since Davey had that choice, Washington did not provide the essential link between 
Davey’s desire to study theology from a devotional perspective at a religious college and 
Davey’s ability to do so.  Thus, Washington did not prohibit Davey’s religious exercise.  
 ii. Coercion of religious exercise 
Not only is prohibition difficult to find when the government excludes a citizen 
from a funding scheme, coercion is also.  As Judge McConnell has noted, there are two 
 
59 As Davey explained, he challenged the law because he found it unfair—not because he needed the 
money; in fact, he "wasn't really desperate for the money.” See Law.com, Life After a Landmark Case, at 
http://www.law.com/servlet/jsp/article.jsp?id=1088699774490.    
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types of coercion—direct coercion and indirect coercion.60 He explains, “’Direct’ 
coercion is government action that forbids or compels certain behavior; ‘indirect’ 
coercion is government action that merely makes noncompliance more difficult or 
expensive.”61 Direct coercion is the Lockean view of coercion;62 this is the narrower 
version of coercion that the Court rejected in the Establishment Clause context, applying 
instead the broader version—indirect coercion.63 However, the Court’s free exercise 
case law clearly demonstrates that direct coercion is the standard for the Free Exercise 
Clause.  In Lyng, for example, the Court did not find governmental coercion because the 
Native Americans were not compelled in any way.  Indeed, they could perform their 
rituals as they wanted—they just could not perform their rituals on government property.    
Under this definition of coercion, it is difficult to imagine how the government 
coerces an individual into participating or not participating in a religious exercise by 
excluding the individual from a funding program.  This is evident in Davey. Joshua 
Davey sought Promise Scholarship funding, which was not available to every resident of 
Washington.  Instead, it was available only to those who satisfied four conditions.   In 
other words, only after satisfying those four conditions did a resident then have the 
choice to receive the funding.  Davey, however, did not satisfy the fourth condition.  
Thus, Davey never had the choice to receive Washington’s funding.  And without even 
the choice to receive the funding, Davey could not have been compelled in any way.   
 
60 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U CHI L REV 115, 160 (1992). 
61 Id. 
62 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, in LOCKE, 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 11 
(Baldwin, 12th ed 1824) (stating that “it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to press 
with arguments, another with penalties”). 
63 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
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Sure, one could object, as Justice Scalia did in his dissent,64 that the condition on 
government funding forms the baseline, and that therefore the withdrawal of funding 
altered Davey’s choices.  This might be right, depending, of course, on whether one 
assumes that Davey’s choice to receive the funding arose when Washington created the 
Promise Scholarship, or if, alternatively, Davey’s choice arose only after he satisfied the 
four conditions.  But even if Justice Scalia is right that Davey’s choice to receive the 
funding arose when Washington created the Promise Scholarship, and that the exclusion 
therefore altered Davey’s choices, this alteration of Davey’s choices did not coerce him 
in the strict sense of the term.  Davey still could study religion at any school he wanted—
he just could not do so with government funding.  Thus, under the Court’s case law, there 
was simply no compulsion and therefore no coercion.   
b. Category Two 
 
The second category of free exercise violations prohibits the government from 
denying a citizen the right to participate in the political affairs of the community on the 
basis of the citizen’s religious affiliation.  Unlike the first category of free exercise 
violation, the second category is not obvious from the text of the Free Exercise Clause 
because a citizen may still exercise his religious beliefs freely when the government 
denies the citizen the right to participate in the political affairs of the community.   While 
the text might not support this category, one can make a strong case for this category by 
pointing to the structure of the Constitution—particularly, the role of the Free Exercise 
Clause in sustaining a republican democracy.   Understanding the relationship between 
the Free Exercise Clause and republican democracy is important to understanding why 
 
64 Davey, 540 U.S. at 726 (“When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit 
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured . . . ”).  
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Davey’s claim does not fall within this category of free exercise violations.   A helpful 
starting point in reaching this understanding is the Court’s plurality opinion in McDaniel 
v. Paty.65 
The dispute in McDaniel arose after Tennessee disqualified a minister, Paul 
McDaniel, from serving as a delegate to the Tennessee constitutional convention by 
enforcing a Tennessee statute prohibiting ministers from serving as delegates.  Although 
there was disagreement in the Court as to what constitutional provision Tennessee’s 
statute violated, the eight Justices participating in the decision agreed that the statute was 
unconstitutional.   
As to whether the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause, the case presented a 
problem for the Court because Tennessee did not regulate McDaniel’s exercise of his 
religious beliefs through a civil or a criminal penalty.  Indeed, McDaniel was free to 
exercise his religious beliefs as he wished.  Accordingly, McDaniel’s religious exercise 
was neither prohibited nor coerced, and his claim, therefore, did not fall under category 
one.  Nonetheless, the Court found something troubling about Tennessee’s decision to 
deprive McDaniel of the right to hold office on the basis of his religion affiliation.  It was 
this conditional relationship between political participation and religious affiliation that 
made the statute unconstitutional despite the absence of a civil or criminal penalty on 
McDaniel’s religious exercise.   
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Chief Justice Burger explained that 
there were two rights at stake in McDaniel. One, McDaniel had a constitutional right to 
 
65 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
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exercise his religious beliefs under the U.S. Constitution.66 Two, McDaniel had a 
statutory right to seek and hold office under Tennessee law.67 According to Chief Justice 
Burger, Tennessee violated the Free Exercise Clause by “condition[ing] the exercise of 
one on the surrender of the other.”68 
Although Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred only in the judgment, they 
expressed agreement with most of the plurality’s reasoning.69 Justice Brennan stated that 
Tennessee’s law was unconstitutional because “[i]t establishes a religious classification  . 
. . . governing the eligibility for office.”70 Because the statute created a connection 
between religious affiliation and political participation, Justices Brennan and Marshall 
found the statute very similar to a test oath.71 Due to this similarity, they concluded that 
the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause.72 
As made clear in both of these opinions in McDaniel, the constitutional flaw in 
Tennessee’s statute was the relationship it established between political participation and 
religious affiliation.  Thus, McDaniel does not mean that all government discrimination 
on the basis of religion violates the Free Exercise Clause.  To the contrary, the case 
means only that government discrimination on the basis of religion that affects political 
participation violates the Free Exercise Clause.  This distinction between religious 
discrimination that affects political participation and religious discrimination that does 
 
66 Id. at 626 (stating that “the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to 
preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister of the 
type McDaniel was found to be”).  
67 Id. (“Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold office as 
legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention.”).  
68 Id. 
69 The disagreement lies in the conduct/belief distinction that was still part of the Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence when McDaniel was decided.   
70 Id. at 632. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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not affect political participation rests on two Free Exercise Clause axioms.  One, the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require equality between religion and non-religion.  Two, the 
Free Exercise Clause protects the political process from religious discrimination. 
 i. Equality and the Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause does not require equality between religion and non-
religion.  In fact, in many instances the Clause requires inequality between religion and 
non-religion.  This non-equality component of the Free Exercise Clause is highlighted by 
contrasting the Free Exercise Clause with the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Equal Protection Clause commands the government to protect all people 
equally.  The Court has interpreted this to mean that the government may distinguish 
citizens on the basis of an attribute only if there is reason to think that the given attribute 
distinguishes people.  In other words, the government must treat similarly situated people 
equally.  Thus, if x factor does not make people dissimilar, then the government may not 
discriminate on the basis of x.   For example, since we presume that race does not by 
itself make people dissimilar, the government may not discriminate on the basis of race 
unless it is an exceptional circumstance.    
By contrast, the Free Exercise Clause limits the power of the government to 
prohibit one thing in particular—religious exercise.  By limiting the power of government 
to prohibit religious exercise without limiting the power of government to prohibit other 
practices, the Clause distinguishes religious exercise from non-religious exercise.   In 
making this distinction, the Clause asserts that religion is different from non-religion.  
Accordingly, people who hold certain religious beliefs must at times be treated 
differently from people who do not hold those religious beliefs.  So while the Equal 
26
Protection Clause requires the government to treat similarly situated people equally, the 
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to treat religious believers differently.73 
This difference between the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
is discussed in Judge McConnell’s critique of Smith.74 According to Judge McConnell, a 
primary difference between the Clauses is that the Equal Protection Clause is 
assimilationist while the Free Exercise Clause is counter-assimilationist. In requiring 
equality, the Equal Protection Clause aims to assimilate and integrate people who are 
fundamentally alike.75 The Free Exercise Clause, however, is counter-assimiliationist in 
that it “allow[s] individuals of different religious faiths to maintain their differences.”76 
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which presumes that people are generally the same, 
the Free Exercise Clause presumes that “people of different religious convictions are 
different.”77 
This explains why Washington did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by 
denying Davey the Promise Scholarship on the basis of his religious affiliation.  
Washington made the decision that the Promise Scholarship should be limited to students 
who use the Scholarship for secular education.   Washington’s decision is entirely 
compatible with the Free Exercise Clause because the decision rests on the premise that 
religious education is different from secular education.   
 
73 For a more in-depth discussion of how the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause differ, 
see JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 42-57 (Harvard University Press 1996).  It should be 
noted that some scholars have argued that ratification of the 14th Amendment transformed the meaning of 
the Free Exercise Clause by making it a mere adjunct to the Equal Protection Clause.  See Abner S. Greene, 
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L. J. 1611, 1614-25 (1993); Larry Alexander, 
Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993). 
74 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U CHI L REV 1109 
(1990).   
75 Id. at 1139.  
76 Id.
77 Id.
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While this non-equality component of the Free Exercise Clause explains why 
states may discriminate on the basis of religion, it does not explain the McDaniel 
decision.  If the Free Exercise Clause permits and at times requires discrimination on the 
basis of religion, why was Tennessee’s statute unconstitutional?    
ii. Republicanism and the Free Exercise Clause 
Although the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from treating 
religion and non-religion differently, the Clause does prohibit the government from 
basing an individual’s political standing on the individual’s religious beliefs.  This is 
made clear by examining the relationship between the Clause and republicanism.  
A central purpose of the Clause is to protect our political system.   This argument 
is advanced in Professor David Richards’ book “Toleration and the Constitution.”78 In 
analyzing the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, Richards discusses the philosophical 
and political context from which the Clause emerged.79 Richards shows how the 
Framers viewed religious liberty as essential to republicanism.   Drawing from the 
writing of Pierre Bayle, who argued for religious toleration in France,80 and John Locke, 
who argued that there is a natural right of freedom of conscience,81 the Framers believed 
that a republican form of government would survive only by protecting religious exercise 
from government intervention, thereby protecting the voice of the people.82 
78 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press 1986).  
79 See id. at 103-162. 
80 See id. at 89-95. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 113 (discussing Madison’s connection between the government’s involvement in religion and 
tyranny).  
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An excellent example of the relationship between republicanism and religious 
liberty is found in Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.83 In that statute, 
Jefferson refers to religious liberty in much the way that Locke did—as an inalienable 
right.  Indeed, according to Richards, “Jefferson appears to have drafted the statute after a 
close study of Locke.”84 Jefferson went even further than Locke—in Jefferon’s words, 
“where [Locke] stopped short, we may go on.”85 While Locke urged for an inalienable 
right to religious freedom, which would include only a right to practice one’s religious 
beliefs free from government intervention, Jefferson argued that in a free society people 
must be free from any form of religious qualification for civil rights.86 As one Jefferson 
historian writes, Jefferson believed that “[o]ur civil rights have no bearing on our 
religious opinions.”87 So, just as “[o]pinions in physics and geometry do not incapacitate 
one for any public duty or office, nor should opinions in religion.”88 
Madison’s Remonstrance also draws from Locke’s writing on human reason and 
its relationship to political decisionmaking.   Of course, Madison’s Remonstrance is most 
famous for its articulation of the taxpayer’s conscience.  But the Remonstrance also 
provides a vivid portrait of what it means to live in a republican democracy.  In the 
Remonstrance, Madison claims that freedom means that citizens have the power to form 
conclusions on the basis of their own beliefs—in his words, “the opinions of men, 
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the 
 
83 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (Va. 1786), quoted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNEL  ET AL,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 69-70 (Aspen 2002).   
84 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 112 (Oxford University Press 1986). 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
66 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1996).  
88 Id. 
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dictates of other men.”89 Because free men must be free to follow their own beliefs and 
not the beliefs of others, religious believers “cannot deny an equal freedom to those 
whose minds have not yielded to the evidence which has convinced [religious 
believers].”90 By the same reasoning, non-religious believers cannot deny an equal 
freedom to religious believers.  
The relationship between religious freedom and political freedom reveals how the 
Free Exercise Clause furthers a republican democracy.   In a republican democracy, our 
freedom is expressed in our beliefs, and our beliefs are expressed in our representatives.  
Accordingly, if our representatives are limited to those individuals who hold certain 
views, the range of our freedom is circumscribed.   Therefore, in order to create a robust 
republican democracy—a system whereby our representatives truly reflect our beliefs—
we must be free to elect whomever we want to elect.    
This explains why the Free Exercise Clause prohibits states from conditioning 
political participation on religious affiliation.  If religious citizens cannot elect politicians 
of their faith, the beliefs held by these citizens are underrepresented.   The beliefs of other 
citizens are effectively imposed on them.  And these religious citizens are thereby less 
free than non-religious citizens.   For example, when Tennessee denied a minister the 
right to serve as a delegate to the constitutional convention, those residents of Tennessee 
who share the minister’s beliefs were denied a voice in the constitutional convention.  A 
truly representative democracy requires the inclusion of their voices.  
However, there is no denial of political representation when a state denies 
educational benefits on the basis of religious affiliation.  Sure, those denied funding must 
 
89 JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973).   
90 Id. 
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pay more than others for education.  But this denial of funding does not bear on political 
representation.  Indeed, those denied funding are perfectly free to elect representatives 
who can either abolish the scholarship program altogether or amend the program so as to 
include those using the scholarship for religious education.   
That there is no denial of political representation in a denial of educational 
funding is illustrated in Davey. Despite being denied the Promise Scholarship, Joshua 
Davey could have elected representatives to change the program, or better yet, he could 
have run for a Washington government position.   There was simply no denial of political 
representation in his exclusion from the Promise Scholarship.  Thus, Davey’s claim did 
not fall under the second category of free exercise violation.   
c. Category Three 
 
Under this third category, states may not force citizens to choose between their 
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.  To understand why Davey’s claim 
did not fall under this third category, it is important to discuss Sherbert v. Verner,91 the 
case that generated this category, and to appreciate two fundamental differences between 
Davey’s claim and the claim at issue in Sherbert.
In Sherbert, the Court declared that the government violates the Free Exercise 
Clause when it forces a citizen to choose between a government benefit and her religious 
practice.  Sherbert arose after Ms. Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired from her 
job for refusing to work on Saturdays, as required by her religion.92 Ms. Sherbert then 
sought unemployment compensation, which she could receive under South Carolina law 
 
91 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963).  
92 Id. at 399. 
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only if her unemployment was involuntary.93 South Carolina refused to provide 
compensation because, according to the South Carolina Employment Security 
Commission, Ms. Sherbert’s termination was voluntary.94 The Court ruled that, by 
forcing Ms. Sherbert to choose between following her religious beliefs but forfeiting her 
unemployment compensation on the one hand, and violating her religious beliefs but 
preserving her eligibility for unemployment compensation on the other hand, South 
Carolina imposed “the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a 
fine.”95 Since a fine on a religious exercise undoubtedly would have violated the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Court found no reason to hold differently in Sherbert.96 
At first glance, Sherbert appears to stand for the proposition that the government 
may never discriminate against religion in a funding scheme.  In two ways, however, the 
Sherbert holding is much narrower than that general proposition.  One, Sherbert is 
limited to situations in which the government funding is conditioned on the non-
performance of an act that a citizen is compelled to perform by her faith.  Two, Sherbert 
applies only when the government discriminates individually. 
i. Compulsion by faith as a necessary condition 
As the Court explained in Davey, Sherbert means that the government may not 
force citizens “to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government 
benefit.”97 This is an either/or situation: the citizen can either follow her faith or receive 
the government benefit.  Thus, this choice between following a religious mandate and 
receiving government funding arises only in situations in which a citizen is compelled to 
 
93 Id. at 400.. 
94 Id. at 401. 
95 Id. at 404. 
96 Id. at 410. 
97 Davey, 540 U.S. at 721. 
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perform an act by her religion, and the government conditions funding on non-
performance of that religiously compelled act.   Accordingly, compulsion by faith is a 
necessary condition under Sherbert.
Davey’s claim does not fall under this third category because he did not show 
that he was compelled by his faith to pursue a degree in theology.  Although Davey might 
have sincerely believed that he had a calling to pursue a degree in theology from a 
religious school, Davey was probably not compelled by his faith to do so.  In fact, there is 
strong evidence that Davey was not compelled in that Davey eventually decided not to 
pursue a career in the ministry and instead decided to pursue a law degree at Harvard 
Law School.98 Thus, a more accurate description of his calling is that he felt impelled to 
pursue a degree in theology—that is, his beliefs inspired him to pursue the degree.  
Because he was impelled rather than compelled, Davey could use the Promise 
Scholarship for secular education without violating his religious beliefs.  Therefore, 
Davey did not have to choose between following his religion and receiving government 
funds.   
By contrast, Ms. Sherbert was not impelled.  She was truly compelled—i.e., her 
interpretation of her religious text forbad her from working on Saturday.  Because Ms. 
Sherbert would have directly violated a textual command in her faith by working on 
Saturday, Ms. Sherbert was presented with an either/or situation.  She could either follow 
her religion and not receive government funds, or should could violate her religion and 
receive government funds.  This is the type of situation that the Free Exercise Clause 
prohibits the government from creating. 
 
98 See Law.com, Life After a Landmark Case, at 
http://www.law.com/servlet/jsp/article.jsp?id=1088699774490. 
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 ii. Individualized v. generally applicable laws 
Even assuming that Davey’s study of religion was just as compelled by his faith 
as was Ms. Sherbert’s sabbatarian observance (which, as described above, is a generous 
and probably false assumption), Davey’s claim does not fall under this third category of 
free exercise violations.  As Justice Scalia explained for the majority of the Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith,99 this category of free exercise violations is limited to 
instances in which the government discriminates individually.100 Justice Scalia’s narrow 
reading of this category is supported by how the Court applied the Sherbert ruling in 
subsequent cases.   
After Sherbert, the Court typically upheld religion-neutral and generally 
applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause, even when they substantially burdened 
an individual’s religious exercise.101 Based on these cases, Justice Scalia noted in Smith 
that Sherbert and its progeny of unemployment compensation cases102 were the 
exceptions to this rule.103 Justice Scalia explained that a different rule applied in these 
unemployment compensation cases because “their eligibility criteria invite consideration 
of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment.”104 And when the 
government considers one person’s reasons for being unemployed, there is a risk that the 
government will evaluate the worthiness of that person’s religious beliefs.   
That is precisely what happened to Ms. Sherbert.  When the South Carolina 
Employment Security Commission asked Ms. Sherbert why she was fired, and Ms. 
 
99 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
100 Id. at 884. 
101 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
102 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 
(1987). 
103 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.  
104 Id.
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Sherbert said that her religion forbad her from going to work, the government assessed 
her reason for not going to work.  By refusing to accept her reason, the government 
implicitly rejected her particular religious beliefs. The government effectively told her 
that her religious reason was not a good reason.   
The individualized nature of this process reveals why the unemployment cases 
raise a unique problem under the Free Exercise Clause.  When the government has the 
power to grant benefits on the basis of whether a claimant’s particular religious reason is 
a good reason, there is a serious risk that the government will accord some religious 
beliefs greater value than others.  This is problematic because when the government 
grants benefits to citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs, a citizen’s status in the 
political community is determined by her religious beliefs.   For example, if the 
government had the power to determine whether a person’s particular religious reason for 
missing work is a good reason, a government official who sympathized with Hindus but 
not Roman Catholics might award benefits to an individual fired for refusing to work in a 
slaughterhouse, but not to an individual fired for refusing to perform abortions.  In this 
case, the Hindu would have a greater standing in the community than the Roman 
Catholic.  And, as discussed earlier, the government’s conditioning of political standing 
on religious beliefs violates a central aim of the Religion Clauses—to sustain a 
democratic republic.105 
As opposed to individualized discrimination against religion, discrimination 
against religion via a generally applicable law presents a minimal threat to religious 
liberty because it eliminates the possibility of the government evaluating an individual’s 
religious beliefs.  When the government excludes all religious callings from a generally 
 
105 See DAVID RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press, 1996).  
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available funding program, the government effectively tells all of its citizens that their 
religious beliefs will not be assessed as good or bad by the government.  This 
consequently preserves the political equality of citizens.  All citizens may exercise their 
religious beliefs freely, unconcerned that the government will deprive them of a 
government benefit that a follower of a more popular faith is awarded.    
Because Washington’s criteria were applicable to all students seeking the Promise 
Scholarship benefits, Joshua Davey could not have been concerned that he was deprived 
of a benefit that a follower of a different faith received.  That is not to say that losing the 
scholarship benefits did not burden Davey.  Clearly, Washington financially burdened 
Davey by taking money away from him.  And surely, this financial burden was 
exacerbated by any metaphysical burden Davey experienced as a result of connecting his 
withdrawn benefits to the fact that he was intensely religious. However, because 
Washington applied its exclusion of religion on a generalized basis, Davey could not 
have been reasonably concerned that Washington would have funded, say, a Jewish 
student’s rabbinical studies.  To the contrary, Davey lost his benefits knowing that every 
person of every faith in the State of Washington would not receive Promise Scholarship 
benefits to study theology from a devotional perspective.  He could feel confident that the 
State of Washington assigned the same monetary value to his interest in becoming a 
Pastor as the State assigned to someone else’s interest in becoming a Priest or a Rabbi.   
For purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, Davey’s experience is a world away from that 
of Ms. Sherbert, who, as she stood on line for unemployment compensation, had reason 
to worry that the person behind her could receive benefits by citing a religious reason for 
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missing work that was more popular with the South Carolina Employment Security 
Commission.   
In light of the constitutional differences between discriminatory regulation and 
funding, the constitutional differences between denying a citizen funding and political 
participation, and the constitutional differences between individualized and generalized 
discriminatory funding, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to Washington’s exclusion.  
Although the Court did not expressly state what standard of review it applied, the Court 
clearly stated that the presumption of unconstitutionality normally applied to free 
exercise violations did not apply to Davey’s claim.106 Instead, a lower standard 
applied.107 Parts II.B explores why Washington prevailed under this lower standard.    
B. The Establishment Clause 
The Davey Court found that Washington satisfied the lower standard of review 
because Washington had a substantial interest in not funding religious instruction.108 
Although the Court did not analyze the nature of this interest—that is, beyond noting the 
tradition in many states of not funding the clergy—it seems that based on the history of 
the Religion Clauses and the Court’s case law there are two powerful arguments 
underlying the Court’s finding of a substantial interest.  One, the funding of religions 
organizations imposes a burden on the taxpayer’s conscience.  Two, such funding 
increases the likelihood of political division and friction.  
1. The conscientious burden 
 
106 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 (“We reject his claim of presumptive constitutionality.”).  
107 Id.
108 Id.
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 James Madison famously explained the conscientious burden in his Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.109 In the Remonstrance, Madison 
convinced Virginia not to use tax dollars to fund Christian teachers because of the burden 
it would impose on the taxpayer’s conscience.  Thomas Jefferson similarly claimed in his 
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of 
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.”110 
As Jefferson proudly explained, Virginia’s decision not to fund religious instruction 
contributed to the liberation of the human mind after centuries of being “held in vassalage 
by kings, priests and nobles.”111 For this reason, he claimed that Virginia “produced the 
first legislature who has had the courage to declare that the reason of man may be trusted 
with the formation of his own opinions.”112 
Although Madison’s and Jefferson’s writings are undoubtedly remarkable, both as 
philosophical and political works, there is reason to question how they can be applied by 
courts in constitutional adjudication.  After all, the principal burden that Jefferson and 
Madison described was a metaphysical burden—indeed, it is difficult to see how 
taxpayers are burdened in any physical way by paying taxes that are later used by the 
legislature for religious instruction.  Even if a taxpayer opposes the funding of religious 
organizations and therefore finds it objectionable that her government uses her tax dollars 
to fund religious organizations, the resulting burden on her conscience, if it can be said to 
exist, is quite abstract and unquantifiable.   
 
109 JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973).  The Remonstrance is reprinted 
in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rutledge, J. dissenting). 
110 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (Va. 1786), quoted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNEL  ET AL,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 69-70 (Aspen 2002).   
111 EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
69 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1996).  
112 Id. 
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The conscientious burden was abstract and unquantifiable then; it is anachronistic 
now.  In the modern welfare state, where the federal government uses tax dollars to 
regulate and fund many programs involving controversial issues, every taxpayer can 
articulate some conscientious burden.  This burden is not limited to the religious 
taxpayer; the secular pacifist, the secular pro-lifer, and the secular environmentalist might 
all be conscientiously burdened by their government’s funding of weapons, abortion, and 
oil production.  As Professors Lupu and Tuttle note in their article on the Zelman 
decision, “There is no principled reason why the consciences of taxpayers with respect to 
religious matters should enjoy constitutional preference over the consciences of taxpayers 
with respect to nonreligious matters, such as support for weapons, sex education, or 
art.”113 
The Court’s rejection of the taxpayer’s conscience argument has infuriated some 
Justices.  Dissenting in Zelman, Justice Souter cited Madison’s reasoning in a vigorous 
argument against the indirect funding of religious education.114 Justice Souter explained 
that Madison’s reasoning regarding the taxpayer’s conscience applies to modern day 
America; indeed, he exclaimed, because we live in a plural state, and because religious 
beliefs invariably clash, government sponsored religious education creates as much of a 
conscientious a burden as ever.115 
113 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round 
of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 945 (2003).  
114 Justice Souter claimed that “Madison's objection to three pence has simply been lost in the majority's 
formalism.” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711.  
115 Justice Souter wrote: “Not all taxpaying Protestant citizens, for example, will be content to underwrite 
the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church condemning the death penalty.  Nor will all of America's 
Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement of the religious Zionism taught in many religious Jewish 
schools, which combines ‘a nationalistic sentiment’ in support of Israel with a ‘deeply religious’ element. 
Nor will every secular taxpayer be content to support Muslim views on differential treatment of the sexes, 
or, for that matter, to fund the espousal of a wife's obligation of obedience to her husband, presumably 
taught in any schools adopting the articles of faith of the Southern Baptist Convention.” Id. at 716.  
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While Justice Souter is surely right that government funding of religious might 
burden the consciences of some taxpayers, he is probably wrong in claiming that federal 
courts should invalidate state funding programs because of this burden.  In a world where 
consequences matter more than theories, it does not make sense for the theoretical burden 
of state funding of religion to prevail under the Establishment Clause.   
But, saying that states do not have an obligation to protect taxpayers from this 
burden is not the same as saying that states do not have an interest in providing protection 
from the burden.  This distinction between constitutionally created mandates and 
legitimate policy interests is an important one—and, unfortunately, a distinction that has 
been overlooked in much of the commentary on Davey. Drawing on this distinction, 
courts should note that even if they should not invalidate state funding programs because 
of this burden, states might have an interest in not funding religious organizations so that 
they can protect their taxpayers from this burden.  So, even if the Establishment Clause 
does not require the states to recognize this interest, the Davey Court properly recognized 
the interests that states have in not funding religious education.   
How strong was this interest in Davey? As many Justices noted in oral 
argument,116 Washington’s interest was probably not very strong, since Joshua Davey 
could have declared a major in business and then taken all of his theology classes under 
the scholarship condition; indeed, Washington did not prohibit him from taking theology 
class but only in majoring in theology.  But, even if this interest in not funding religious 
education was not strong, it is an interest that is part of this country’s tradition, and, 
moreover, it is an interest at the foundation of the Establishment Clause.  Thus, while this 
 
116 The oral argument can be found at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/1631/audioresources. 
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interest might not be very strong, it is, nonetheless, an interest of constitutional 
dimensions, and the Court properly recognized it as such.  
However, even if a state were to apply this interest in a more rigorous way than 
Washington applied it in the Promise Scholarship, it would be a stretch to characterize 
this interest as substantial. After all, as noted above, the burden is merely a metaphysical 
one, and metaphysical burdens have not made for strong arguments in federal courts.117 
Moreover, it would not make sense for the taxpayer’s conscientious interest to trump the 
more particularized conscientious interest that citizens have in being treated equally.  
Indeed, if it can said that a person experiences a conscientious burden resulting from the 
government’s funding of religious education even when the funding does not directly 
affect her, it surely can be said that a person experiences a more pernicious conscientious 
burden when the government takes money away from a person because of her religious 
affiliation.  Furthermore, it does not make sense for the taxpayer’s conscience to trump 
the economic interest that citizens like Joshua Davey have in receiving government 
funding that they have qualified for based on religion-neutral criteria.  To defeat this 
concrete and practical interest that religious citizens have in receiving government 
funding, states must provide a similarly concrete and practical interest—such as the 
interest that states have in preventing political division and friction.   
 2. Political division and friction 
In addition to expressing concern about the government’s funding of religion 
leading to a conscientious burden on taxpayers, Madison explained in the Remonstrance 
that political division would result from such funding. While the Remonstrance is 
 
117 This is illustrated in the Court’s standing jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing a 
concrete injury).  
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probably most famous for its articulation of the taxpayer’s conscience, it must be 
remembered that the Remonstrance was not merely an inquiry into metaphysical burdens; 
it was much more than that; indeed, it was a legal argument supported by both theoretical 
and practical reasoning.   The practical element of the argument focused on the 
disharmony that would result from Virginia’s funding of religious instruction.  Such 
funding, Madison warned, would “destroy . . . moderation and harmony” and was, 
therefore, an “enemy to the public quiet.”118 
Jefferson also made this link between political unity and the government’s refusal 
to fund religious instruction.  In a letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, Jefferson discussed the 
role of religion in his prized university, the University of Virginia.119 After noting that 
there is no divinity professor at the University, and that Jefferson’s decision not to hire a 
divinity professor has led many to question whether the University opposes religion, 
Jefferson explains how he defended his decision to the Virginia legislature.120 Jefferson 
writes to Dr. Thomas Cooper that the letter to the legislature began by “stating the 
constitutional reasons against a public establishment of any religious instruction,”121 and 
then proceeded to argue that, besides the constitutional concerns, it is expedient not to 
provide religious instruction because “by bringing the sects together, and mixing them 
with the mass of other students, we shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize 
their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and 
morality.”122 
118 See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973).   
119 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 1463 (The 
Library of America 1984).  
120 Id. at 1465. 
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This link between government funding and political friction has not gone 
unnoticed by the Court.  On many occasions, the Court has found that avoiding political 
friction is a reason for states not to fund religious organizations.123 Perhaps most 
significantly, the Court focused on this link in its foundational case of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,124 where, after stating that government acts that excessively entangle 
government and religion are unconstitutional, the Court explained that state programs 
with a “divisive political potential” are presumptively unconstitutional because of their 
tendency in creating such impermissible entanglement.125 
Recently, Justice Breyer has suggested that preventing political division is the 
central purpose of the Religion Clauses.  In Zelman, he thought that the Court should 
have invalidated Ohio’s voucher program because, despite the apparent benefits to low-
income students, the fact that most of the money went to religious schools made the 
program “potentially harmful to the nation’s social fabric.”126 Justice Breyer looked 
again to political divisiveness in his critical concurrence in one of the recent Ten 
Commandment cases.  After noting that a basic purpose of the Religion Clauses was to 
“avoid that divisiveness based on religion that promotes social conflict,”127 Justice Breyer 
upheld the Texas display because forcing its removal might “create the very kind of 
religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”128 
Several Justices have questioned the role that the political divisiveness factor 
should play in the adjudication of disputes in federal courts.  In Zelman, the majority 
 
123 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795 (1973) 
(discussing the relevance of “the potentially divisive political effects of an aid program” to the Court’s 
Establishment Clause analysis).   
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responded to Justice Breyer’s invocation of the political divisiveness principle in his 
dissent by questioning “what sort of principle Justice Breyer [had] in mind, considering 
that the program had ignited no ‘divisiveness’ or ‘strife’ other than this litigation.”129 
Since the protection of people from political division sounds like a policy matter, not a 
juridical matter, the Court expressed concern as to “where Justice Breyer would locate 
[the] presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have 
chosen but that we subjectively find ‘divisive.’”130 This concern is particularly great in a 
federal court, where the authority to hear and adjudicate issues is constitutionally 
circumscribed.   
Considering the federal judiciary’s circumscribed authority, the majority correctly 
rejected Justice Breyer’s reasoning in Zelman. It does not make sense for federal courts 
to adjudicate the constitutionality of state laws according to whether or not they might 
create political friction.  Surely, if courts were charged with the duty of preventing 
political friction, courts would get entangled in local political feuds involving issues that 
federal courts cannot fully appreciate.  Moreover, resolving disputes under the criterion 
of political divisiveness will make for fuzzy, and, arguably, arbitrary adjudication.  For 
example, who is to say what will lead to friction?  Since any church-state issue that gets 
to a court is going to be contentious and sectarian—after all, litigation is contentious and 
church-state issues are religious—either party can argue that the court’s ruling for the 
other party will create acrimony along religious lines, and thus either party can formulate 
a political division argument for why the Court should rule in her favor.  As the political 
divisiveness criterion does not make for a sharp or reliable juridical tool, the political 
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divisiveness of a program involving the funding of religious organizations should not 
determine the constitutionality of the program.   
But, again, that federal courts should not invalidate government acts that touch on 
religious matters merely because of their political divisiveness does not mean that states 
do not have a cognizable interest in avoiding political division by refusing to fund 
religious education.  One of the primary duties of the state government is to protect 
citizens.  And this is a duty that states are well-equipped to perform.   So federal courts 
should defer to state decisions as to whether a particular program will create political 
conflict.   Thus, by pointing to specific facts indicating that the government’s funding of 
religious organizations will not only burden the consciences of many taxpayers but will 
also divide the people, a state should be able to prove that it has a substantial interest in 
not funding religious education.  
Under this formulation, the Davey outcome was right.  Although Washington did 
not justify its exclusion of Davey on this basis, Washington could have established how 
funding students wishing to study religion would have created division among 
Washington residents.  Since there do not appear to be any colleges or universities in 
Washington offering programs for students seeking to become a Rabbi131 or an Imam132 
or a Brahmin,133 it is unlikely that Jews, Muslims, or Hindus would be able to use the 
Promise Scholarship benefits to study their respective faiths from a devotional 
 
131 After a long Internet search, I was unable to find any universities or colleges in Washington offering 
programs for students seeking to become a Rabbi.  The closest Jewish University I could find to 
Washington is the University of Judaism, which is in California. See http://www.uj.edu. Under the Promise 
Scholarship requirements, a scholarship beneficiary could not use the benefits to enroll in a college outside 
Washington.  Thus, a student could not use the benefits to enroll in the University of Judaism.   
132 I was also unable to find any universities or colleges in Washington offering programs for students 
seeking to become an Imam.  In fact, I found only two Islamic schools in Washington, both of which are 
elementary schools.  See http://www.bellevuemosque.com/Local_Islamic_schools.htm. 
133 I was also unable to find any schools offering programs for students seeking to become a Brahmin.   
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perspective.  While there are not any schools offering these Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu 
instruction, there are several colleges and universities offering Christian instruction.134 
Despite their small populations, it is likely that some Jews, Muslims, or Hindus would be 
eligible for the Promise Scholarship, and would want to use the funds to study their own 
religious backgrounds from a devotional perspective.135 But, because of Washington’s 
requirement that the students use the funds in the state, and because there are no schools 
in Washington offering majors in Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu studies, no Jewish, Muslim, 
or Hindu students would be able to study their religious backgrounds from a devotional 
perspective with scholarship funds.  Accordingly, only those students seeking to study 
Christianity from a devotional perspective would be able to use state funds to do so.   By 
creating the conditions that allowed only Christians to study their religion with 
government funds, Washington could have increased the friction among different 
religious groups.  Thus, Washington had a strong interest in excluding the study of 
religion from a devotional perspective from the Promise Scholarship.    
II. ASSUAGING CONCERNS 
Many commentators have expressed concern about the discretion that the Davey 
Court granted the states in refusing to fund religious organization.  There are three 
reasons why there should not be too much concern. One, because the Framers intended, 
and the public originally understood, the Religion Clauses to be a federalist directive, 
 
134 There are at least six Christian colleges and universities in Washington: (1) Northwest College, (2) 
Pacific Lutheran University, (3) Puget Sound Christian College, (4) Seattle Pacific University, (5) Trinity 
Lutheran College, and (6) Whitworth College.  Of course, because these colleges are denominational, some 
denominations might not be able to study their particular faiths with state funds.  But even if that were the 
case, any member of a Christian denomination could study the fundamental principles of their faith—
Christianity—with state funds.  That could not be said for Jews, Muslims, or Hindus—that is, they could 
not study the fundamental principles of their respective faiths with state funds.     
135Although these groups respectively make up about 1% of the state population, surely this is a large 
enough percentage to mean that there are some Jews, Muslims, and Hindus are eligible for the Promise 
Scholarship who want to study their religious backgrounds in college.  
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federal courts achieve some of the desirable effects of originalism—namely, political 
accountability and judicial consistency136 —by deferring to the states on close church-
state questions.  Two, because states have different needs and interests at stake in 
partnering with religious organizations, federal courts further state policymaking by 
granting states discretion to experiment in developing church-state policies.  Three, 
because decentralization might protect religious liberty and autonomy, federal courts 
might further the central goals of the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to hold states to a 
restrictive, monolithic standard.  
 A. The Religion Clauses as a Federalist Directive 
Noting that the text of the Religion Clauses only speaks to the powers of 
Congress, and that many states had officially established churches when the Framers 
adopted the First Amendment, many eminent scholars have concluded that the Framers 
intended the Religion Clauses to prevent only the federal government from passing laws 
respecting the establishment of religion and prohibiting the free exercise of religion.137 
Thus, some argue, the Religion Clauses are best understood as a federalist directive.  
If the Religion Clauses are read as a federalist directive, the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the means that the federal government employs, not the ends. In other words, 
the Establishment Clause prohibits the federal government from affecting the status of 
religion in the states.  This means that the federal government may not establish or 
disestablish religion.  And if one accepts that the Establishment Clause prohibits the 
 
136 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); and ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 251-59 (Collier Macmillan 
Publishers 1990).  
137 See STEVEN SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-54 (Oxford University Press 1995); and EDWARD S. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF 
POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 106 (Michie Co., 1951) (declaring that "the principal importance of the 
[First] Amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective jurisdictions of State and 
nation regarding religion . . . .").   
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federal government from both establishing and disestablishing religion, then the Court’s 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment was in 
itself a violation of the Establishment Clause.  Indeed, the Court cannot read the Due 
Process Clause to require the state disestablishment of religion when forcing states to 
disestablish religion violates the Establishment Clause—that is, unless one subscribes to a 
Godelian view of constitutional interpretation.138 But if one insists on complete 
consistency within the constitutional system, disincorporation of the Establishment 
Clause is necessary.  For this reason, some commentators and Justices today maintain 
that although the Court might have been right in incorporating the Free Exercise 
Clause,139 the Establishment Clause should not have been incorporated.140 
The strength of these disincorporationist arguments might be questioned.  After 
all, the original intent of the Framers in adopting the Religion Clauses is certainly less 
relevant after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, the argument that 
it is illogical to incorporate the Establishment Clause assumes that there is no individual 
 
138 By a Godelian view of constitutional interpretation, I am referring to an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that adopts the incompleteness theorem proposed by the mathematician Kurt Godel. See 
Wikepedia, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%F6del%27s_incompleteness_theorem.  According to this theorem, axioms 
in a consistent system sufficiently powerful to produce propositions will always produce propositions that 
cannot be proven by the system itself.  Only under such a system of thought can the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporate the Establishment Clause when doing so violates the Constitution. 
139 Most agree that the Free Exercise Clause clearly should be incorporated under the reasoning that the 
other provisions in the Bill of Rights have been incorporated.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause “invites incorporation” 
because it “was paradigmatically about citizen rights, not state rights”). 
140 Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not 
Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1706-07 (1992).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has expressed his support for this interpretation of the Framer’s intent.  In his dissent in Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97 (1985), he argued that “[t]he Framers intended the Establishment Clause to 
prohibit the designation of any church as a ‘national’ one.”  Justice Thomas recently suggested that he 
would like to disincorporate the Establishment Clause. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (explaining that he would like “to begin the process of rethinking the Establishment 
Clause” because “the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists 
incorporation”). 
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liberty right in the Establishment Clause.  This assumption is probably false.  As Justice 
Brennan keenly observed in his concurring opinion in Abbington School District v. 
Schempp,141 “The fallacy in this contention is that it underestimates the role of the 
Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious 
liberty.”142 Because the Establishment Clause guarantees liberty along with the Free 
Exercise Clause, it does not make sense to apply only one Clause to the states.  Most 
importantly, at least as a practical matter, the argument that the Court erroneously 
incorporated the Establishment Clause is irrelevant because too much time has passed; 
indeed, it is unlikely that the Court will overrule its decision to incorporate the 
Establishment Clause after more than 50 years of uninterrupted application to the 
states.143 
Importantly, however, one need not believe in disincorporating the Establishment 
Clause to believe that the federalist background of the Religion Clause should inform the 
federal judiciary’s adjudication of church-state issues.  Since the Religion Clauses were 
understood originally as a federalist directive, and since there is reason to believe that the 
Establishment Clause should continue to apply to the states, granting states broad 
discretion in designing their own church-state relations in certain cases achieves the 
systemic predictability and democratic accountability that some have argued are achieved 
in an originalist jurisprudence.  One such case when federal courts should grants states 
this discretion is when there are strong state interests for both separating from and 
partnering with religious organizations.     
 
141 374 US 203 (1963). 
142 Id. at 256. 
143 The Court incorporated the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). 
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 B. State Needs and Interests  
There are strong state interests for both separating from and partnering with 
religious organizations when it comes to the provision of social services.  Communities 
of course vary greatly in religious, social, economic, and racial composition. To 
determine how these characteristics relate to people’s views on church-state relations, 
Professor Jelen of Illinois Benedictine College and Professor Wilcox of Georgetown 
University had people from different backgrounds fill out questionnaires on various 
church-state issues.144 They found that a person’s religious identity informs how one 
views church-state issues.145 For example, they found that Roman Catholics are 
significantly more likely than Jews to favor both aid to religious institutions and 
protection of a Judeo-Christian heritage.146 In addition, they found that a person’s 
education is related to one’s views on government aid to religion;147 according to the 
study, greater levels of education make it more likely that a person will oppose 
government aid to religion.148 They also found that people with higher incomes tend to 
oppose government aid to religion.149 Race is also a factor;150 as compared to the white 
respondents, “[b]oth African Americans and Hispanics [are] less likely to hold 
separationist attitudes, and [are] considerably more likely to be accommodationists.”151 
This study suggests that communities differing in religious, social, economic or 
racial composition will differ in how their residents perceive government aid to religious 
 
144 TED G. JELEN & CLYDE WILCOX, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH AND STATE (M.E. Sharpe, 
1995).  Their study consists of two surveys—one in the Washington D.C. area, and another in 
Williamsburg, Virginia.   
145 Id. at 65. 
146 Id.
147 Id. at 68. 
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149 Id.
150 Id. at 69. 
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organizations.  For example, the study indicates that if a wealthy community wanted to 
develop a K-12 voucher program,152 the majority of the community would want to 
prevent religious schools from participating.   
A wealthy community should have the discretion to exclude religious schools 
from the program because denying the community this discretion is inconsistent with our 
federalist scheme.  Just as states may provide more speech protection than the Free 
Speech Clause requires,153 more privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment 
mandates,154 and a more searching rational basis review than the Due Process Clause 
demands,155 states should be able to erect a higher wall between church and state than the 
U.S. Constitution requires.156 Thus, a community should be able to exclude religious 
schools from a voucher program.   
However, it does not follow that because some communities may exclude 
religious schools from a voucher program that all communities must.  Just as denying one 
community the power to exclude religious institutions from its voucher program is 
inconsistent with our federalist scheme, denying another community the authority to 
make sure its children are safe and educated is inconsistent with our conception of 
liberty.  Communities should be able to ensure that their children are safe.  And many 
parents in urban communities support voucher programs because they want their children 
 
152 It should be noted that this might not be a realistic hypothetical, since there is reason to doubt that a 
wealthy community would want a voucher program.  See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043 (2002). 
153 See, e.g., State v. Shid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (holding that the New Jersey State Constitution 
protects citizens from the speech restraint of private property owners even though the Free Speech Clause 
only applies to governmental action).  
154 See, e.g., People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the “open fields” doctrine because the 
New York State Constitution protects privacy more than the Fourth Amendment).  
155 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).  
156 Determining the precise limit on the height of this wall is of course one of the goals of this Article.   
This will be discussed in Parts III.    
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to be safe.157 Communities should also be able to make sure that their children are 
educated; indeed, as Justice Thomas noted in Zelman, “without education one can hardly 
exercise the civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”158 And many parents support voucher programs because they want to 
improve their children’s education.159 Faced with crime and poor education in secular 
schools, and safety and quality education in religious schools, children should be able to 
jump the wall to the religious schools—even if doing so requires using tax dollars for 
religious instruction.  The Religion Clauses should not create such a high wall between 
religion and non-religion so that overcoming this hurdle is impossible.           
C. Decentralization and Religious Liberty  
Not only might decentralization of authority over church-state relations achieve 
originalist goals and promote social experimentation; it also might be an effective means 
of guaranteeing religious liberty.  Professor Richard C. Schragger makes this argument in 
his paper on local government and religious liberty.160 He argues that when 
governmental authority is dispersed, government is less able to control religion; indeed, 
“political decentralization ensures that the national councils do not have a monopoly on 
the power to regulate religion.”161 And when there is no monopoly on religion, religious 
organizations are free to compete.  This competition, in turn, “prevents any one sect from 
 
157 Of the parents who were surveyed as to their motives for enrolling their children in the Cleveland 
voucher program, 95% cited their children's safety. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704.  
158 Id. at 680.  
159 Of the parents who were surveyed as to their motives for enrolling their children in the Cleveland 
voucher program, 96.4% claimed that they wanted their children to have a better education.  Id. at 704. 
160 Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).  
161 Id. at 1815.  
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gaining political dominance in the whole.”162 Thus, decentralization guarantees religious 
liberty, particularly for minority sects.    
In addition, Schragger argues, decentralization makes it more difficult for 
religious groups to control government because decentralization empowers local 
governments.  Schragger argues that when the federal courts or Congress make 
exemptions for religious organization, they “undermin[e] an important institutional 
location for the articulation of public norms and values.”163 By undermining local 
institutions, federal courts and Congress weaken local government.164 And when local 
government is weakened, religious organizations are consequently in a better position to 
control government, which of course means that the risk of oppression of minority sects 
is greater.165 Thus, decentralization makes the local government a formidable guardian of 
religious liberty.   
III. CREATING A NEW PARADIGM 
A. Establishing the Davey Rule 
The Court announced a new rule in Davey. That much is clear regardless of one’s 
view on religious establishment or religious liberty.  However, commentators disagree on 
what the rule is.  Thus far, two interpretations of the rule have appeared.  
Professor Marci Hamilton has offered the broadest reading of the holding.  In an 
article analyzing the decision, she explains that in Davey “[t]he Court could not have 
been clearer . . . [that] [i]n Free Exercise challenges, hostility to religion must be shown 
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for strict scrutiny to apply.”166 She supports this interpretation of Davey by pointing to 
the majority’s statement that Davey is not like Lukumi.167 She concludes that since 
Lukumi, unlike Davey, involved animus against religion, the difference between the 
outcomes in Davey and Lukumi is due to the fact that there was no animus in Davey.168 
Thus, the Davey Court held that discrimination against religion is permissible under the 
Free Exercise Clause so long as it is not motivated by animus.169 
Contrary to her claim that the distinction between Davey and Lukumi rests on the 
state’s motives for passing the law, the Court’s distinction between Davey and Lukumi 
clearly rests on the burden imposed on the claimant.  In fact, the Court could not have 
been clearer about this.  The Court explicitly stated that Davey was not like Lukumi 
because Davey merely involved withdrawn funding whereas Lukumi involved criminal 
sanctions.170 In making this distinction, the Court clearly expressed that Davey’s claim 
did not fall into the first category of free exercise violation—the category that prohibits 
the government from regulating on the basis of religion.   
Under Professor Hamilton’s broad reading of the Davey ruling, however, this first 
category would be narrowed to apply only when in regulating religious individuals or 
organizations the government evinced hostility towards religion.  This would mean that 
the government could prohibit religious exercise so long as the government did not have 
a bad motive in doing so.  But this was not what the Court held in Davey. In fact, one can 
be sure that had Washington enacted a law prohibiting the study of religion altogether, 
 
166 Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court Issues a Monumental Decision: Equal State Scholarship Access for 
Theology Is Not Required by the Free Exercise Clause, at 
http://www.constitutioncenter.org/education/TeachingwithCurrentEvents/Viewpoints/TheSupremeCourtIss
uesaMonumentalDecision.shtml. 
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170 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720. 
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with or without state funding, the Court would have struck down that law even if 
Washington expressed no animus in passing the law.  Because Professor Hamilton’s 
animus-rule is simply nowhere to be found in the opinion, and because her animus-rule is 
at odds with the Court’s formulation in Smith171—and indeed would overrule some of the 
Court’s free exercise case law172—her argument that the Davey opinion rests on motives 
is therefore implausible.   
On the other extreme are Professors Thomas Berg and Douglas Laycock who 
believe that Davey can be plausibly read to apply only to the funding of the clergy.173 As 
compared to Hamilton’s animus-only interpretation, there is plenty of evidence in the 
opinion supporting this clergy-only interpretation.  After all, the facts before the Court 
involved the funding of Joshua Davey, a person seeking to become a Pastor.  Moreover, 
much of the Court’s reasoning can be applied only to the clergy.   Indeed, the majority 
opinion frequently cites the tradition of not funding the clergy as support for the 
proposition that Washington had a substantial interest in excluding Davey.   And the 
majority frequently suggests that the Court’s inquiry was not whether states could refuse 
to fund religious organizations altogether, but rather whether states could refuse to fund 
the clergy.   
However, this reading of Davey is not simply narrowed to the facts of the case; 
the reading is much more unfaithful to the opinion than that; the reading ignores the core 
doctrinal and policy issues before the Court.  As a doctrinal matter, this interpretation is 
unreasonably narrow, as it fails to account for the Court’s attempt to distinguish the 
 
171 How, for instance, would she reconcile Smith, where Justice Scalia emphasized formal neutrality rather 
than unbiased motives?  
172 This animus-rule would have to overrule Yoder, and perhaps Sherbert and McDaniel.
173 Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Davey's Mistakes and the Future of State Payments for Services 
Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L.J. 2 (2005).  
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withdrawal of funding from three categories of free exercise relations.  If the Court was 
interested in drawing a narrow exception for the funding of the clergy, there would be no 
need to distinguish the withdrawal of funding from the three categories of free exercise 
violations.   Rather, the Court could have merely stated that, for historical reasons, the 
funding of the clergy is different from the funding of religious organizations—then the 
Court could have stopped the analysis there.  But the Davey Court did not make this 
distinction between religious organizations and the clergy.  Instead, the Court made a 
distinction between three categories of free exercise violation and the withdrawal of 
funding.  There is nothing in this distinction suggesting that it should or can apply only to 
the clergy.    
In addition, the Court did not indicate that the “play in the joints” between the 
Religion Clauses is limited to the clergy.  And, not only did the Court not expressly limit 
the applicability of this principle, it would be odd if this flexibility did not refer to the 
distinct relationship of religious exercise and establishment under the U.S. Constitution—
a relationship that applies to all relationships between religion and government—but, 
instead, referred only to a special relationship between religious professionals and 
government.  
Furthermore, as Justice O’Connor noted in oral argument, the issue before the 
Court implicated the policy decisions of the states.  Indeed, the Justices and lawyers 
discussed at length in oral argument how the decision would have an impact on K-12 
voucher programs and the Blaine Amendments.174 Thus, reducing Davey to a case about 
the funding of clergy simply misconstrues what was at stake in the decision.   
 
174 The Blaine Amendments are amendments to state constitutions calling for more separation between 
church and state than the Establishment Clause requires.  These amendments are known as Blaine 
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Based on the oral argument and the text of the opinion, it does not seem that 
anyone who participated in the case viewed it as a case limited to the funding of the 
clergy.  Rather, it seems that everyone understood Davey to be a case about the funding 
of religion.  Accordingly, contrary to what Professors Berg and Laycock argue in their 
article, the Court’s decision granting states discretion clearly extends to government 
decisions beyond the funding of clergy. 
As these different interpretations of Davey suggest, it is not clear what the Davey 
rule is.  To be sure, it is clear that the opinion does not make animus a necessary 
condition for free exercise violations or apply only to the funding of clergy.  But much 
more than that is not clear.  However, the majority’s reliance on the church-state 
principles examined in this Article suggests that the rule is a composite of these 
principles.  Because the Court declared that strict scrutiny does not apply when the 
government discriminates on the basis of religion in a generally available funding 
program, and because the Court established that states have a cognizable interest under 
the Establishment Clause in excluding religious organizations from generally available 
funding programs, the rule from Davey can therefore be stated in these terms:  A state 
may discriminate on the basis of religion within a generally available funding program 
that does not directly affect an individual’s ability to participate in the political 
community only if the state’s religious classification relates to a cognizable 
Establishment Clause interest.   
 
Amendments because of their relationship to James G. Blaine’s proposed amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  In 1875, when Blaine was Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, he proposed an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting states from funding religious institutions.  After Blaine’s 
amendment failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate for ratification, many states 
passed their own versions of the amendment. According to the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, there are 
thirty-nine Blaine Amendments.  See http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.htm.; see also PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Harvard University Press, 2002).  
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While I believe this formulation to be a faithful account of the decision, I do not 
believe that it is ideal as a constitutional doctrine.  For one, it does not provide the criteria 
for identifying a cognizable state interest under the Establishment Clause.  And, perhaps 
more importantly, it does not explain the requisite relationship between the state’s 
Establishment Clause interest and its chosen means of achieving that interest.  Because 
the test does not provide these details, it is, as of now, quite manipulable.   
This manipulability is evident in the fact that by merely reciting its interest in 
protecting the consciences of state taxpayers, a state can satisfy this test every time it 
refuses to fund a religious organization.  For instance, a state opposing religious 
education could exclude religious schools from its K-12 voucher program by claiming 
that its Blaine Amendment, which is derived from the taxpayer’s conscience, prohibits it 
from funding religious education.  Indeed, there is already evidence of states citing Davey 
for this proposition, as the Florida Supreme Court recently interpreted the Florida State 
Constitution to compel the state to exclude religious schools from a K-12 voucher 
program, and found that the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Court in Davey,
permitted the state to exclude these schools.175 Thus, under the Davey formulation, 
states can discriminate against religion whenever they want—even when the motives are 
not religion-neutral, even when the means are not religion-neutral, and even when the 
effects are not religion-neutral.     
Even more problematic than Davey permitting states to discriminate against all 
religions arbitrarily is the possibility that states may favor one religious group over 
another.  Since withdrawing members of one religious organization from a general 
funding program partially reduces the burden imposed on taxpayers of funding religion, 
 
175 Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 344 (Fla. 2004). 
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states have an interest under the conscientious burden justification in refusing to fund one 
denomination.  To be sure, states have a greater interest for refusing to fund all 
denominations.  But, under the conscientious burden rationale, states also have an 
interest in refusing to fund only one denomination.   
For this reason, Justice Scalia expressed concern in oral argument that if the Court 
held that states may discriminate on the basis of religion, as Washington urged the Court 
to rule, then, a fortiori, states also must be able to discriminate on the basis of one 
religion.  To determine whether there is a limiting principle prohibiting sect-specific 
discrimination, Justice Scalia asked Washington’s counsel whether her argument meant 
that it would be constitutional for Washington to fund all religious instruction except for, 
say, Jewish studies.  After Washington’s counsel failed to provide a case explaining why 
discrimination generally against all religions is permissible but discrimination 
specifically against one religion is not, it seemed that by ruling for Washington the Court 
necessarily would abandon the most settled proposition in church-state law since 1947— 
that both Clauses require “the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers.”176 
That Davey can lead to the abandonment of the neutrality principle raises more 
than mere stare decisis concerns.  If the Court were to abandon this principle, the Court 
would uproot the central criterion—whether or not an act is neutral towards religion—in 
adjudicating church-state issues, thereby leaving the Court’s jurisprudence in disarray.  
Furthermore, because the principle has explained what it means for religion to be 
constitutionally distinct—religion’s distinctiveness requires the government to treat 
religion neutrally—and because the principle has reduced the inherent tension between 
 
176 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (emphasis added). 
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the Clauses—since both Clauses require the government to treat religion neutrally, the 
principle mitigates the concern that the government will violate one directive by 
vigorously enforcing the other—abandoning the principle would complicate the question 
of how distinct religion is and how the Clauses relate.  In sum, if the Davey rule is going 
to be a workable rule, it must be squared with this neutrality principle.  
B. Squaring the Davey Rule with the Neutrality Principle 
While the neutrality principle has accomplished the two important feats of 
explaining what it means for religion to be constitutionally distinct and of reducing the 
inherent tension between the Clauses, the principle has raised a new problem: What does 
it mean to be neutral?   Even though most of the Justices agree that neutrality is the 
baseline for adjudicating church-state issues, the Justices disagree sharply about what 
neutrality means.   
Some Justices believe that neutrality requires strict separation between 
government and religion. Reading neutrality this way, the Court has held that the Free 
Exercise Clause compels the government to exempt religious groups from formally 
neutral laws, 177 and that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from directly 
funding religious organizations.178 
177An excellent illustration of this is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, Amish parents 
claimed that their children were entitled to an exemption from Wisconsin’s compulsory high school 
attendance law because the lessons taught in public high school violate the Amish faith. Id. at 209. Writing 
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger began his analysis by establishing the substantial burden that high 
school education places on Amish families. Id. at 210.  Chief Justice Burger then noted that the law at issue 
was facially neutral towards religion. Id. However, Chief Justice Burger held that “a regulation neutral on 
its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental 
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Id. at 220.   Because this law had the effect of 
substantially burdening the free exercise of the Amish faith, the Amish parents were entitled to an 
exemption from the law under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 234. 
178 For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) the Court struck down two state programs that 
provided funding to both religious and secular schools so long as the funds were used for secular purposes. 
Id. at 606. The Court ruled that, in order to make sure that the state funding was used only for secular 
instruction, the government would have to monitor the religious schools. Id. at 615. And because this 
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Other Justices, however, believe that neutrality is merely a formal requirement.  
In contrast to the separationst model of neutrality, formal neutrality disregards the effects 
of the law at issue and instead focuses on its terms.  The Rehnquist Court incorporated 
this idea of formal neutrality into both Clauses, holding that the Free Exercise Clause 
does not require the government to exempt a citizen from a law that substantially burdens 
her religious exercise if the law is generally applicable and neutral,179 and that the 
government may fund religious organizations so long as the funding criteria do not 
consider the religious affiliation of the recipient.180 
As illustrated in the Court’s case law there is not much overlap between a substantive 
and a formal conception of religion-neutrality.  The problem lies in the term “neutrality”—it 
does not have one meaning.  As Justice Harlan has noted, neutrality is “a coat of many 
colors.”181 Similarly, literary theorist Stanley Fish believes that religion-neutrality is 
meaningless as an independent criterion because neutrality “has meaning only within some 
particular set of background conditions.”182 Perhaps Harvard Divinity School Professor 
Ronald Thiemann captures the problem best when he calls the Court’s notion of neutrality “a 
 
monitoring would have the effect of excessively entangling government and religion, the Court held that the 
funding violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 625. 
179 In Smith, the Court held that religion-neutral and generally applicable laws are valid even if they 
substantially burden religious exercise.  Smith, 494 U.S. at  879.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
made it clear that, by neutral, he meant formally neutral.  He explained in a footnote: “Just as we subject to 
the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on race . . .  so too we strictly scrutinize 
governmental classifications based on religion.” Id. at 886 n.3 (emphasis added). 
180 For example, the Court held in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) that the set of restrictions 
Aguilar had placed on states are not required by the Establishment Clause.  The thrust of the Agostini 
decision is that when a government funding program is sufficiently broad so as to include both religious 
and secular beneficiaries, and the criteria for providing funding do not refer to religion, there is no 
Establishment Clause problem.  The Court confirmed this rule in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 US 793 (2000), 
where the plurality of the Court uphold the direct distribution of secular educational materials to religious 
and secular schools on a per capita basis because the criteria were formally neutral between religion and 
non-religion. 
181 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
182 Stanely Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2255, 2266 (1997).  
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protean concept.”183 Just as in Ulysses, where James Joyce spun readers into a maelstrom by 
introducing the stream of consciousness in the chapter “Proteus,”184 the Court has lost 
followers of the Court by introducing its protean concept of neutrality into church-state 
jurisprudence. 
However, in searching for the meaning of religion-neutrality, the Court has 
accomplished two important tasks: one, the Court has proven that religious-neutrality 
does not have one meaning, and two, the Court has established how different meanings of 
neutrality can apply to the Religion Clauses.  As a result of the Court’s search for a 
neutral relationship between religion and government, we know that, at its most strict, the 
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to exempt religious believers from 
facially-neutral laws when the laws substantially burden their religious exercise.  
However, at its least strict, the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to 
invalidate laws that are either not generally applicable or not facially neutral towards 
religion.  And as a result of the Court’s search for a neutral relationship between religion 
and government, we know that, at its most strict, the Establishment Clause means that the 
government may not interact with religion when doing so has the effect of promoting 
religion.  But at its least strict, the Establishment Clause means that the government may 
interact with religion so long as in doing so it is evenhanded towards both religion and 
non-religion.  The Court has thus set the ceiling and the floor for how the government 
may treat religious matters.   This is crucial to a state seeking to determine how it may 
 
183 RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 60 (Georgetown 
University Press 1996).  
184 This is the third chapter of Ulysses. The chapter begins cryptically: “Ineluctable modality of the visible.”  
The chapter does not get any easier for readers.   
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treat religious matters under its constitution because federal ceilings and floors form the 
framework of state law.185 
Thus, a state should have the discretion to partner with religion above the floor of 
formal neutrality, so long as it remains below the ceiling of substantive neutrality.  This 
functions best in a direct funding scheme.  For example, based on a substantive 
conception of neutrality, if a state decides to provide funding to schools, the state may 
provide funding to secular schools without including religious schools in the program.186 
Conversely, based on a formal conception of neutrality, states may include schools in the 
program when the funding criteria do not refer to religion.187 
However, this linear paradigm does not apply as easily to indirect funding 
schemes like the Promise Scholarship.  Finding the floor is the simple part.  When private 
beneficiaries choose how they want to use government funds, the floor is the Zelman 
decision.  Thus, so long as private beneficiaries independently choose their schools, the 
government funding of religious schools is permissible.  But for the government to go 
above the floor, the government must prevent beneficiaries from funding religion.  To do 
this, the government must single out religious organizations from the program.  And by 
singling out religion, the government violates the core requirement of formal neutrality.  
In such situations, any attempt to build above the floor thereby pulls the state below the 
floor.  This is the circle created by the neutrality requirement of the Religion Clauses.  As 
 
185 In his influential article on state constitutional law, Justice Brennan argued that states should read their 
respective constitutions between the floor and any ceiling that the U.S. Constitution sets on state action.  
William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 
(1977).  This way, states can provide a second layer of protection for citizens.   Notably, many state courts 
have followed Justice Brennan’s advice.  For example, citing Justice Brennan’s article, the New York 
Court of Appeals found that the New York State Constitution guarantees “a broader scope of protection 
than that accorded by the Federal Constitution in cases concerning individual rights and liberties.” People 
v. P. J. Video, Inc, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303 (1986).  
186 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
187 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 US 793 (2000). 
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Chief Justice Burger wrote, “The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be 
an absolutely straight line.”188 Reducing the Clauses to a linear equation of ceilings and 
floors therefore appears futile—it is like finding a ceiling in a circular room.  
A ceiling is found in this circular room by examining the Court’s interpretation of 
what it means to be neutral when the government singles out religion.  In this respect, 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos189 provides 
some help.  In Amos, the complainants argued that exemption for religious organizations 
violated the Establishment Clause by impermissibly “drawing distinctions on religious 
grounds.”190 The Court rejected this claim, ruling that when the government 
discriminates between religion and non-religion, the law is valid under the Establishment 
Clause so long as it is “motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental 
interference with the exercise of religion.”191 The idea is that when the government seeks 
to achieve a goal of the Free Exercise Clause, the government does not, as the Amos 
Court put it, “abandon neutrality”192 if in pursuing the goal the government goes beyond 
what the Court has interpreted the Clause to require.   
In Davey, the situation was exactly like that in Amos—but the reverse.  In Amos,
the issue was whether the government violated the Establishment Clause by passing a law 
that classified based on religion in order to provide liberty for religious organizations.  
The Amos Court upheld the law because the law’s purpose was related to the aim of the 
Free Exercise Clause—religious liberty.  In Davey, the issue was whether the government 
 
188 Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
189 483 U.S. 327 (1987).   
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violated the Free Exercise Clause by pursuing an aim of the Establishment Clause—
disestablishment of religion.   
Amos therefore means that the government should be able to protect the interests 
of the Establishment Clause more than the Clause requires.  Thus, if the government 
justifies a law with an interest that is not in line with those interests connected with the 
Establishment Clause, the law is not neutral towards religion under the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  As such, the law is above the ceiling and it therefore violates the U.S. 
Constitution.   But if the government offers a substantial interest under the Establishment 
Clause, the law is neutral towards religion, and accordingly, the act should be upheld.   
This application of Amos to the Establishment Clause, however, does not answer 
Justice Scalia’s question as to whether the government may discriminate against all 
religious organizations but not against only one religious denomination.   If Amos means 
that states satisfy the Free Exercise Clause whenever they discriminate on the basis of 
religion so long as they connect the discrimination to religious disestablishment, wouldn’t 
that mean that states may exclude certain denominations from funding programs, since 
such exclusions partially achieve religious disestablishment?  
The answer is that even though excluding one religious denomination from a 
program partially achieves religious disestablishment, doing so is not permissible because 
discrimination on the basis of religion is not religion-neutral—not under either a 
substantive or a formal conception of neutrality under either Clause.   The Court has said 
as much, though perhaps not quite in that language.   
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In Larson v. Valente,193 for example, the Court struck down a Minnesota law 
providing that “only those religious organizations that received more than half of their 
total contributions from members or affiliated organizations would remain exempt from 
the registration and reporting requirements.”194 Although the law did not facially 
discriminate among religious sects, the law had a disparate effect on different religious 
sects, burdening non-traditional religions, which usually acquire funds through 
solicitations, while not burdening traditional religions, which rarely acquire funds 
through such means.195 After finding abundant evidence in the record that Minnesota 
legislators intended to discriminate against particular religious groups in enacting the law, 
the Court concluded that the law violated the Establishment Clause.196 
So laws intended to favor or disfavor certain religious groups are not religion-
neutral if they succeed in doing so.  But what about laws that expressly favor or disfavor 
certain religious groups?  Intuitively, this would seem more problematic, since what is 
prohibited in substance is almost always prohibited in form.  And this intuition finds 
significant support in the case law.   
In Larson, Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Religion 
Clauses prohibit the government from expressly preferring one religion over another, but 
permit the government to pass laws that have a disparate impact on different religions.  
They concluded that the Minnesota law was constitutional because it did not expressly 
prefer one religion over another.197 
193 456 U.S. 228 (1982).  
194 Id. at 230. 
195 Id. at 247. 
196 Id. at 254-55. 
197 Id. at 261 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this view in other cases as well.  Dissenting in 
Wallace v. Jaffree,198 he claimed that a primary purpose of the Religion Clauses was “to 
stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination 
or sect over others.”199 Justice Thomas echoed this argument in Rosenberger v. Rector,200 
concluding that the government may fund religion when it does not prefer any religious 
faith because “the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on 
governmental preferences for some religious faiths over others.”201 In fact, the 
proposition that the government may not pass laws facially preferring one religion is so 
settled that in searching for the original meaning of the Religion Clauses one 
commentator has claimed that express preferentialism is all that the Framers intended to 
prohibit.202 Thus, whether or not one adopts a substantive or a formal conception of 
neutrality, singling out one religious group for favored or disfavored treatment is not 
religion-neutral.   
Since the Court held in Larson that preferentialism violates the neutrality 
principle contained in the Religion Clauses, that means that under either a substantive or 
a formalist definition of neutrality the government’s favoring of some religions and 
disfavoring of others cannot be characterized as religion-neutral.  Therefore, when the 
government passes a law that singles out religion, the Religion Clauses require that the 
law not prefer some religions over others.  Thus, if Amos can be applied to government 
 
198 472 U.S. 38 (1985).  
199 Id. at 113.  
200 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
201 Id. at 855. 
202 Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the 'No Preference' Doctrine of the First 
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 136-39 (1986).  It should be noted that this contention might 
not be historically accurate.  See Douglas Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion: A False Claim About 
Original Intent, 27 WM & MARY L. REV. 875, 877 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he prominence and longevity of 
the nonpreferential aid theory is remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and the quite strong 
evidence against it”).  
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policies seeking religious disestablishment, that means that the government may not pass 
a law that discriminates on the basis of one religion, even if it partially achieves religious 
disestablishment.  
Now we have filed the holes in Davey, bringing this paradigm to fruition.  Davey 
means that a state may discriminate on the basis of religion within a generally available 
funding program that does not directly affect an individual’s ability to participate in the 
political community only if the state’s religious classification relates to a cognizable 
Establishment Clause interest.  The problem with this rule is that it seems to permit the 
use of non-neutral means in achieving the Establishment Clause interest.  Amos corrects 
this problem, providing that the government does not offend one Religion Clause in 
singling out religion if the government establishes a connection between the law and the 
interests contained in the other Clause, and if in doing so the government does not use 
means that abandon the neutrality principle.   And Larson tells us that when the 
government passes a law that expressly or purposely favors or disfavors one religion to 
others, the law is not religion-neutral.  
Putting all of this together, the new paradigm is this: In an indirect funding 
program, a state may go above the requirements of the Establishment Clause by 
excluding religious organizations from generally available funding programs so long as 
the state has a substantial religion-neutral interest under the Establishment Clause.  Being 
that the two primary interests expressed in the Establishment Clause are, one, to protect 
the consciences of taxpayers and, two, to encourage harmony among different religions, 
the state must seek each of these two interests in order for its exclusion of religion to be a 
substantial interest under the Establishment Clause.   And since the government must use 
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religion-neutral means, and since discriminating on the basis of one religion is not 
religion-neutral, the government must exclude all religions if it is going to exclude any.  
With this as the standard, states will be limited in how much higher than the 
Establishment Clause they can go.  Washington, for example, would not have satisfied 
this scrutiny by asserting only an interest in protecting the consciences of its taxpayers.  
Instead, Washington would have to demonstrate, in addition to how the exclusion 
protected the consciences of taxpayers, how the exclusion protected its residents from 
religious friction.  Despite the fact that Washington did not demonstrate how it was 
protecting its people from religious friction, the Davey reasoning and outcome are right.  
Sure, the Court’s reasoning was underdeveloped in that the Court did not explain fully 
how the exclusion fits with the meaning of the Religion Clauses.  And sure, 
Washington’s failure to justify its exclusion of Davey makes the outcome questionable.  
But, at its core, the Davey reasoning and outcome are right—because there were 
substantial reasons under the Establishment Clause for excluding the study of religion 
from the Promise Scholarship, because these reasons are at the heart of the meaning of 
the Establishment Clause, and because the Court properly recognized that states have 
much to contribute in finding the appropriate balance between religious liberty and 
disestablishment.   
CONCLUSION
The Religion Clauses are so difficult to grasp, intellectually, and so difficult to 
settle, doctrinally, because the Clauses are inherently contradictory.  Thus, it might be 
appropriate that the paradigm developed in this Article rests on its own contradictory 
foundation—that, by searching for one Religion Clause principle, the Court created 
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many, and that these many principles can be combined to create a unitary standard for the 
states to follow.   
The protean meaning of neutrality gives the states discretion and therefore 
preserves the federalist nature of the Religion Clauses.  This truly brings us back to the 
meaning of protean.  Just as Menelaus could find his way back home to Helen only by 
taking a hold of Proteus, a sea god who could change his shape at will, we can bring 
church-state relations back to the states by holding on to the Court’s protean concept of 
neutrality. 
 
